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ABSTRACT
Since about 1963-64, U.S. strategic nuclear planning has
broken down steadily. The thesis desci ibes an important determi-
nant of tnis deterioration, namely the d vorce between force struc-
ture and employment planning. The history and dynamics underly-
ing this disconnect are discussed, and the implications of the trend
are considered.
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION
This thesis will examine the accelerating deterioration of
U.S. strategic nuclear force planning from about 1962 to the present.
I will focus on one crucial trend over this time--the divorce of em-
ployment and force structure planning to the point that:
.the two planning activities do not interact in a productive
fashion by which the establishment of effective future forces,
plans, doctrine, etc. is promoted,
.force and employment capabilities are so divergent that ex-
tremely inappropriate situations may arise,
.future changes in the nuclear forces will most likely be based
on some pretty poor precedents, aggravating-things even
more.
By "divorce" of the two types of planning, I mean to suggest that nei-
ther of the two is providing effective input into the larger U.S. strate-
gic planning arena.
According to a widely read monograph [28:3], U. S. strategic
planning actually is a blend of employment, force structure, declara-
tory, and deployment planning. Of the four, the former two are by
far the most important, since these alone contribute to the shaping
(as opposed to the mere identification) of desirable strategic condi-
tions. Put another way, we try to construct our strategic tomorrow
with these twin tools. As a corollary, (and mainly because our ma-
jor adversary also tries to shape and manipulate developments), we
attempt to employ the same devices to rationalize and to render ap-
propriate our "contemporary" posture as that will appear in the "stra-
tegic context" which is determined by both friendly and antagonistic
agency, and by a host of unpredictables.
5Briefly defined, force structure (or sizing) planning describes
decision-making on force size, constitution and capabilities. A deci-
sion to withhold developmental funds for, say, improved POSEIDON
accuracy in this sense is identical to a decision to buy Bomber A or
Missile B. Employment (or contingency) planning is bound to use the
forces available to plan nuclear operations to achieve goals as stipu-
lated by national political authorities. The vehicle for strategic em-
ployment policy is the SIOP, a set of emergency war plan packages.
Some might argue that each matter is one of the two sides of
the same coin. After all, someone who plans to buy a car will weigh
equally and simultaneously the dual problems of 'employment' and
'force structure' in his or her decision. If a major mission of the
planned vehicle is the economical transportation of large payloads
(supplies, family, tools for the job, etc.), then a pool of candidate
cars, vans and station wagons (as oppos ed to sport cars) presumably
will be under consideration. Likewise, if the proposed acquisition is
a second car mainly for leisure activities, a different "force struc-
ture" decision will be likely. From another point of view, a person
who is inclined towards a given car probably has a good idea a priori
of its likely employment. In this hypothetical case, the close linkage
of the two factors is a prudent--and obvious--course of action.
Intuitively, the close coordination of force and employment
plans is desirable, if not essential, in strategic planning. Suppose
that U.S. political and military leaders place a very high priority
on the successful attack of Soviet hard military targets. We would
want an inventory of accurate, prompt weapons for this job. But say
that the Soviets' symmetrical development of such plans (and the ac-
quisition of the RVs needed to implement those plans) threatened our
silo-based ICBMs to the extent that we could not be confident of their
availability. We could turn to accurate SLBMs or to alternative bas-
ing mode ICBMs. As everyone knows, we're currently in the middle
of this exact problem. Regrettably we now find ourselves with a sub-
stantial gulf between the onset of the problem and the activation of a
cure because we have deferred too long some key planning decisions.
This is an important, but by no means unique, example of the divorce
of force structure and employment planning.
Planning is not only intended to keep us out of jams. We can
use planning to enforce disadvantageous cost-exchange ratios on the
U.S.S.R., to compel the Soviets to follow our lead (if not to imitate
us), and to preempt the development of unfavorable situations. We
can plan so as to minimize future surprises and thereby avoid the
kinds of expensive crash programs that are attendent upon precarious
strategic relationships tending towards instability. U.S. and Soviet
planning is not a zero-sum game, eithe -. Both sides can use planning
as a moderating force, a source of partial certainty, and as a counter-
weight to risky schemes promoted by parochial interests; in this sense,
good planning is the best arms control. Not only is taking the long
view the responsibility of civilian and service authorities alike--it is
without doubt a useful tool for the painless preservation of the nation-
al security.
Now, there is no particular catastrophe which must befall us
if our planning "fails, " and in fact many anomalous circumstances
may lead to good solutions which might not have otherwise been gene-
rated by even the best plans. If, say, a nation wishes to enhance its
domestic well-being, or to shore up some non-nuclear security capa-
bility, a disruption in strategic nuclear planning is in order. Because
the contingencies and forces we have prepared will only become opera-
tionally relevant in extremis we might even find ourselves able to take
an occasional "chance" by suspending the development or maintenance
of some strategic capability or other.
However, things may have gone too far in this direction. As
will be argued in Chapter II of this thesis, U.S. forces today essential-
ly are those designed by SecDef McNamara in 1961-63. McNamara
was required at the time to use a general index for force sizing (assur-
ed destruction) mainly to resist USAF initiatives to acquire extra forces
under the flag of "counterforce. " Since the Johnson Administration's
ICBM "clean up" of 1964, SNDV levels have been driven by attrition in
the bomber force. Since about 1966-68, even the artificial rule of as-
sured destruction has been discarded and force levels have evolved by
virtue of momentum alone. As I will also argue, one major post-1963
SOF "procurement" program- - MIRV- -did little to change U. S. strate-
gic capabilities. Like other bomber and missile upgrades undertaken
between 1964 and 1979, MIRV merely wz s a change of U.S. forces at
the margin. A second highly publicized activity- -improved ICBM ac-
curacy--has, to the extent we have made commitments actually to buy
advanced capabilities, been neutralized by Soviet accuracy improve-
ments. It equally is a change at the margin.
In Chapter III, I will look at the evolution of employment plan-
ning. Although it is impossible to say for sure, targeting seems to
have changed little over the last 20 years. Of the two key Soviet tar-
get arrays: Counterforce (hard target) and the Urban/Industrial (U/I)
base, the former has been a driver, if not a crutch, for war planners.
It is possible that target planners would "shoehorn" U. S. forces of any
type into these types of attacks, no matter how matters of efficiency
may impinge. Commitment "in full" to either or both targets constricts
U.S. capabilities in other regards. Worse, the effectiveness of U.S.
forces in the hard target mission has rapidly declined with increasing
MINUTEMAN vulnerability. As a result, it is very unlikely that we
will be able to satisfy the "Damage Expectency" goals stipulated by
guidance without engaging in wildly inefficient attacks.
In Chapter IV, I will discuss the specific actions we have taken
to arrive at the current situation. I will nominate some "cures. " Fi-
nally, I will pose a few important allied questions, the discussion of
which would be a desirable complement to future planning.
Because talk is a lot cheaper than strategic nuclear hardware,
we have invested Lynn Davis' third type of planning with inordinate im-
portance. The turmoil surrounding our strategic debates may not ad-
dress with fidelity the key issues. For example, if U.S. strategic
employment planning has not changed too much over time, then what
accounts for the seeming enormity of our doctrinal swings over the
last two decades? And if planning has changed, then why haven't force
developments kept pace?
U.S. strategic planning is not entirely shot through. A lot of
good decisions which have made have been overturned or deflected for
a number of reasons. Planners, both within and outside of the govern-
ment have devoted impressive talent and attention to a plethora of seem-
ingly insoluble problems. When measured in terms of output, however,
the planning story is not always flattering to its participants. The net
picture suggests the deliberations of auto company executives who
must decide annually whether next year's strategic forces will have
fins, simulated wood panelling, an extra-wide chrome grille, or what
have you. Under bad circumstances, we may paint fierce teeth on our
car to scare potential aggressors. But, no matter how valid the point
might be that nuclear war is a dangerous and risky business, it is dis-
couraging to hear threatened "Launch on Warning" or to have nuclear
operational planning couched in a game-of-chance metaphor. Finally,
when a set of developments does cast into doubt the entire concept of a
"gas guzzler, " we are apt to respond first by installing on the console
an elaborate mileage computer to enable us to update constantly some
"draw-down curve" of transport effectiveness.
It is apparent that repairs are in order. Probably the best
way of effecting useful change is to improve our understanding of mili-
tary planning in general. This thesis seeks to point out some of the
factors behind the formation of a single type of force for only part of
that force's existence. The exercise might be useful as an input into
an analytic effort of broader scope.
Before continuing, I would like to acknowledge the con-
tributions of several experienced defense planners with whom I spoke
during the preparation of this thesis. I am especially grateful to Pro-
fessor W. W. Kaufmann for many insights and lessons on planning,
the value of which are impossible to gauge. I am also indebted to Pro-
fessor Harvey Sapolsky for taking the time to assist in the supervision
of this paper. I have benefitted greatly from Professor George Rath-
jens' excellent and lucid presentation of some of the vital operational
components of strategic posture and contingency planning. And for
her indispensible contribution to this effort I must thank Ms. Fran
Stefan, whose great kindness I hope to be able someday to repay.
CHAPTER II: U. S. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR OFFENSIVE FORCES SIZING
Many stories have described and many analyses have sought to
explain the determinants and predicates of the evolving U.S. SOF struc-
ture. Regardless of the diversity of theories and methods employed in
such studies, however, all have a common denominator. Each demon-
strates that any given force structure decision is made in a complex,
turbulent and unique environment. There is no doubt that generaliza-
tion of the colorful dynamics of the "weapons acquisition process" is a
risky occupation. Accordingly, no effort is made here to interpret any
particular developments.
Rather this chapter will examine certain larger force structure
trends. I will first trace briefly historical force structure develop-
ments, and note those key decisions which have shaped this evolution.
I will display some SNDV and warhead data which I will use to analyze
war plans and effectiveness of U.S. forces in Chapter III. In the ag-
gregate, and according to strategic "rules of engagement", (employ-
ment plans), the force structure has remained more or less at a steady
state, relative to those objectives defined by the national targeting gui-
dance. As will be seen in Chapter III, some major force sizing discon-
nects--most notably the MIRVing of U.S. ballistic forces--essentially
preserve, rather than increase or modify, U.S. offensive operational
capabilities. The strategic force story more recalls the White Queen's
advice to Alice ("it takes all the running you can do to stay in one
place") than it suggests the more popular demonology of Molochian arms
racing.
The conclusions of this chapter are these. First, U.S. forces
have been modified at the margin to keep pace with the changing U.S. /
Soviet strategic context. Second, we may have reached the end of the
road in our practise of "fixing up" the forces bought in the early 1960s.
Third, and in seeming opposition to the spirit of the Race to Oblivion
metaphor, at no time during the last fifteen years was it likely that the
U.S. would deploy new forces to change radically the complexion of
our strategic capabilities, because we could not have afforded to do so.
BRIEF HISTORY OF THE US SNFs
Historically, U.S. SNFs have been sized according to a single
rule: forces are procured so that a sufficient supply of warheads is
available with which to cover some predetermined set(s) of targets un-
der specified contingencies. As anyone familiar with strategic or tac-
tical targeting knows well, however, a target inventory or bombing en-
cyclopedia tends to generate more targets than can be attacked by a
force of feasible size. In the interests of economy, therefore, the
SecDef and others traditionally have been obliged to oppose the serv-
ices and have sought to restrain the definition of "essential" target sys-
tems to lists of moderate size. This particular source of strife--to-
gether with occasional controversy surrounding the attribution of pri-
orities to various classes of candidate targets--has been in fact at the
root of all points addressed by the ongoing "strategic debate."
The evolution of the U.S. strategic nuclear force structure is
thus linked to the pressures applied to the target list which has been
suggested by the national guidance, with an upper bound imposed by
(usually) civilian planners. The force structure planning process
See Ref [33] for a brief narrative history of U.S. SNF sizing mile-
stones
Chapter III is devoted to a detailed examination of targetting issues,
and the relative effectiveness of U.S. SNFs in various missions.
For the moment we review only the most essential targeting issues
as they affect centrally force sizing.
might be described using the annual OSD/service budget process as an
analogue. The joint target staff selects some unwieldy set of targets,
together with pessimistic estimates of U.S. SOF reliability, thereby
developing a case for a JSOP-style warhead inventory. OSD then sub-
mits guidance to the services restricting numbers of warheads, and
the targeteers then "do the best they can" within those constraints.
In actuality, force sizing does differ from budget preparation
in one crucial respect: unlike an annual budget request, a debate over
the ability to cover targets (and, therefore, force size) occurs irregular-
ly, and results from perturbations induced in forces caused by two types
of enemy activity. First, if the U.S.S.R. can reduce the apparent ef-
fectiveness of U.S. forces by such measures as active defenses, by a
threat of preemptive strike, or by hardening targets, one response
which the U.S. might elect is the deployment of extra warheads to com-
pensate for reduced force effectiveness. Second, if the set of designat-
ed "high priority" targets grows, more warheads must be added as a
matter of course. Necessary warhead loadings show no tendency to
drop off in number over time, because the Soviet target base has not
decreased in size; nor has the U.S. revised its definition of "high pri-
ority targets. " Consequently, tne U. S. SNF structure is more or less
an evolving accretion of "packages" oriented towards specific types of
targets.
As will be argued in Chapter III, there is no straightforward
way of determining exactly how many warheads are necessary to ac-
complish the objectives in the national guidance given changes in U.S.
forces or Soviet targets. As a result, relatively arbitrary target se-
lection (and, by association, force sizing) rules have been used in
lieu of the determination of force sizing according to specific effective-
ness criteria. Strategic force sizing is essentially a "seat of the pants"
business. With this in mind, let's examine the major events which
have shaped U.S. force structure developments.
Before 1950, of course, the maximum size of the U.S. offen-
sive arsenal was thought to be limited, even in the long run, by a
shortage of fissile materials. Target planning was done carefully
and in the style of 8th and 15th Air Force style of targeting of World
War II. After an ample supply of Uranium was ensured (by doubling
the commodity's market price), the USAF was able to increase great-
ly the size of its target roster. Targeting continued to be discrimi-
nating and precise, though, and it was focused on destroying particu-
lar economic capabilities as opposed to terrorizing central cities.
With a growing supply of bombs available, the question remained to
determine the appropriate number of Soviet targets to be destroyed
and thereby compute the bomber forces necessary for this job.
Around 1950, using photographs made b7 the Germans, the USAF set
about determining "what, cumulatively, was needed to destroy the
Soviet Union. " [24:141] The outcome of this and other efforts appears
to have been the establishment of a canonical warhead delivery require-
ment for U.S. forces of something on the order of 1000 or so weapons
on Soviet targets. One senior defense official is said to have reported
that a SIOP based on the plans operational through the 1950s would de-
liver at the minimum about 1000 weapons, presumably on the Soviet
Union. [4:186]. And, according to H. York,
"In the late forties and early fifties, before the invention
of the H-bomb, it was determined that we needed one
thousand delivery vehicles (then land-based and sea-based
bombers) in our strategic forces. This was determined
by several factors: professional judgments informed by
World War II and the Korean experience; calculations
(for high penetration reliability); and probably most im-
portant, purely fiscal considerations . .
[36:31
If this "kilotarget" (or some similar) criterion was used as a planning
device, then it would follow that about 2000 SNDVs--given worst-
plausible-case assumptions about the effectiveness of enemy defenses
and the damage which could be wrought in a sneak attack--would be re-
quired.
As this assumption is not unreasonable, I will proceed from
this point. Assuming that USAF and USN either did not collaborate on
targeting [5:171] or that they divided up responsibility for different
types of targets [23], (and if TAC was configured for theater-oriented
nuclear strikes--as appears to have been the case given the technical
capabilities of then-deployed aircraft), then it seems that over the
period 1956-59, SAC achieved a sort of equilibrium in its ability to
cover targets, i. e. no particular stresses existed which would drive
up requirements for weapons. As B-52s (with two weapons) replaced
B-47s (with a single bomb) roughly on a 1:2 basis, it was also clear
that, in the absence of major change in the strategic environment or
in planning, SAC capability would remain remarkably constant for
some time into the future. That a balance between forces and targets
had been reached is evident in then-Colonel Glenn Kent's reported stub-
born opposition to the McNamara targeting reforms of 1961 on the
grounds that the move would threaten SAC's ability to cover its finely
tuned target menu.
The forging of an apparent target:force linkage during the
period 1950-1961 was made possible by a remarkable stability in the
strategic employment planning environment during that time. This
was due to several factors. For one thing, the constitution of the So-
viet target base remained relatively constant over the entire time,
and the fact of constancy was abeted by the relative lack of sophistica-
tion of contemporary U.S. reconaissance and target data collection
resources. Second, the use of large (up to 24 Megaton) weapons against
most targets then confronted meant that, since Pk was nearly unity,
lethality considerations were of minor importance in satisfying required
OPKs. Lack of sophisticated reconaissance and geodetic data probably
also figured in the (by today's standards) unrigorous selection of aim
points, as did the inaccuracy associated with then-practised bomb re-
lease techniques (drogue and toss bombing). Pre-launch survivability
(while a matter of some concern [91] was not as important an issue in
the pre-1960 period as it has come to be with a powerful Soviet ballis-
tic missile threat against CONUS forces, and airborne alert and dis-
persal could decrease part of the remaining threat posed by bomber,
Cessna, or suitcase sneak attacks. U.S. plans did not incorporate
"withhold options" either, and campaign planning was complicated by
none of the uncertainties associated with recycling regrouping and con-
trolling attrited forces. Most important, SAC devoted heroic efforts
to ensuring the reliability of its bombers by deploying sophisticated de-
fense suppression munitions, decoys, and aircraft. 1 When an aircraft carries
its own defense suppression capability, or when defense suppression
and confusion is to be performed by a bomber on airborne patrol or
by a quick reacting unmanned system, there are none of the uncertain-
ties which one encounters where survival of individual types of sys-
tems is not so certain.
It is not surprising then that the quick-paced developments of
the early-1960s--ballistic missile threats to bombers, appearance
and proliferation of a new type of very important target (missiles), a
U.S. decision to diversify its strategic forces into a TRIAD, and Air
Force interest in buying several new manned bombing systems (B-70,
and X-20--"DYNA SOAR"--among them)--combined to throw the deli-
cate force structure-target balance--known as "optimum mix"--into
disequilibrium. McNamara's "no-cities" doctrine surely provided an
additional source of "irritation" to the situation. Originally, for exam-
ple, the proposed counterforce targeting reforms ordered by McNamara
worried SAC/JSTPS. The plans would lead to great difficulties in cov-
ering the SIOP target list for two reasons
. Options were seen as possibly eroding the big one-shot
SIOP which JSTPS had carefully prepared as SAC's only
contingency.
. The reformed SIOP was seen as a "threat" to planned
USAF weapons systems. In particular, the requirement
for withholding forces at graduated stages of central con-
flict biases force planning against bombers which are not
as suitable for being withheld as are armored or mobile
ICBMs and SLBMs.
Immediately on the commencement of revised employment planning,
however, the Air Force's attitude was reversed. Ball describes the
subsequent developments:
"While U.S. targeting plans were being revised, work
was also underway redesigning the U.S. strategic pos-
ture to make it compatible with the new nuclear war-
fighting strategy. In the spring of 1961 the NESC was
formally directed to 'determine the force levels neces-
sary to accomplish the objectives of the NSTAP. I The
NESC study (the Hickey study) concluded that the current-
ly programmed strategic force was inadequate for that
objective. It recommended a much expanded Minuteman
force (2000-2150 missiles by 1971), the development of
much improved CEPs and very high warhead yields (over
50 megatons for advanced Titanmissiles), a variety of
yield options for SLBM warheads (from kiloton to multi-
megaton range), and the procurement of a force of recon-
naisance-strike bombers with 'fully reprogrammable'
cruise missiles and 'very high Pk . . against any target. I" 2
[20:12-13]
In short, the Air Force used the McNamara "no cities" strategy as a
basis for requesting new forces far in excess of those considered pre-
viously.
This is not to suggest that the new McNamara strategy unleash-
ed an Air Force "bureaucracy" which had been straining at the bit for
an excuse to promote new forces. On the contrary, the Hickey study
"was by far the best available on the subject to that date.
The study group developed a list of all strategic targets,
and, using the best available intelligence and their own
judgment, projected the growth of these target lists over
the next ten years. They then estimated the performance
characteristics of the planned weapon systems of all the
Services and calculated how many would be needed to de-
stroy 75 percent and 90 percent, respectively, of the pro-
jected targets in each of the next ten years. These calcu-
lations were summarized and forwarded along with force
recommendations to the Secretary of Defense. "
[5:172]
The Hickey study was a remarkable anomaly, because it marked the
only attempt ever made in U.S. strategic planning history to build si-
multaneously war plans and forces. The fatal constraint behind the
effort, of course, was the budget.
Enthoven and Smith argue that McNamara responded to the sub-
sequent arresting requirements for new weapons and increased pro-
grams by asking "why 90 percent or 75 percent (of all targets)?" [5:179]
They claim that while attempting "to find better criteria (than mere
across-the-boards target destruction percentages) . . . it was
McNamara's judgement . . . that the ability to destroy in retaliation
20-25 percent of the Soviet population and 50 percent of its industrial
capacity was sufficient. " Systems Analysis developed a chart showing
that 400 reliable EMT was sufficient to accomplish these damage
levels. 3 Enthoven and Smith claim that "this judgement was influenced












these" [5:175]. This fact was portrayed in a well-known relationship,
shown in Figure one.
Given the original declared requirement that each leg of the
TRIAD should be able to accomplish this mission independently, the
definition of Assured Destruction in this manner seems to be an ele-
gant yet simple force structuring rule based on a practical U.S. stra-
tegic objective; the ability to inflict intolerable damage on the Soviet
Union as retribution for serious aggression.
However, this hypothetical rule for force structuring is almost
certainly not accurate. As I will show in Chapter Three, no decision
was made to cease counter military (especially counterforce) targeting,
nor is it apparent that any attack was ever prepared on the basis of an
analytic rule used in computing A. D. criteria. On the contrary, it
seems that assured destruction was set up as a force sizing rule by
McNamara (arbitrarily) and was based on the capabilities of the forces
which McNamara had already planned to procure! "A.D. " merely was
a simple "snapshot" description, albeit an ingenious one, of the capa-
bilities of then available and programmed U.S. forces which was to
serve as a ceiling on force size. Thus:
FIGURE 2
BACK OF THE ENVELOPE FORCE SIZING EXERCISE 4
41 POLARIS 16 x (1)2/3 x 41 = 656 x (. 6 availability) = apprx 400 EMT
450 MINUTEMAN = 450 x (1)2/3 = 450 x (.9 availability) = apprx 400 EMT
300 B-52 = 300 x 4 x (1. 5)2/3 1600 x (. 25 reliability) = apprx 400 EMT
The reader may reject these numbers as circumstantial; however,
McNamara's intention not to exceed these force levels (obviously there
are the unintentional exception of the MINUTEMAN and the B-52s, but
20
these derived from external action) is clearly evident in his decision
to turn off the strategic force increase budget after FY63 and FY64.
Within a given leg of the TRIAD's 400 EMT allotment, all of
the strategic missions for that leg (whether or not they had to do with
retaliatory attacks) were prepared. [4:181] Between the different com-
ponents of the TRIAD, special roles also were assigned to prevent com-
petition and to assist in optimal use of available forces in SIOP planning.
It has been persuasively argued [8:99] that the Polaris fleet was more
or less exclusively dedicated to the urban/industrial full-SIOP retalia-
tory role. Bombers and ICBMs concentrated more on the Soviet mili-
tary target base, and the latter were vital to counter-ICBM operations,
because only ICBMs could be on enemy missile targets (especially har-
dened missiles) with sufficient promptness to destroy those weapons be-
fore they could be used. Accordingly, an exception to the 400 EMT rule
arose for ICBMs, even with the larger force of 1000 MINUTEMEN plan-
ned. As will be argued in Chapter III, enemy ICBM targets are one of,
if not the highest priority target systems. This being the case, it is
probable that planning is done according to relatively strict criteria,
such as "one reliable warhead one target." Because one "reliable war-
head" practically speaking is two a priori warheads, Air Force planners
might have attempted to size their ICBM forces by the rule "two times
expected enemy silo population. "
According to figures published by Albert Wohlstetter, projected
(and actual) Soviet ICBM deployments for selected years are:
FIGURE 3
A PRIORI ESTIMATES OF SOVIET ICBM STRENGTHS







Interestingly, Air Force force procurement initiatives are re-
markably congruent with these assessments. The 1964 Damage Limit-
ing study assumed that 600 Soviet ICBMs would be deployed by 1969
[4:241]; simultaneously, Air Staff was pi oposing a force of 1200
MINUTEMAN. Similarly, the original Lickey Committee proposal
for about 2000 MM was based on a 1958-59 projected Soviet target
base of about 1000-1200 Soviet ICBMs. 5
The two-ICBM shots per silo rule was not to be, as McNamara
turned off the MINUTEMAN program at the planned six wing deploy-
ment. Subsequently, force sizing is said by a senior defense official
to have been defined by a rule of one "best possible" warhead per silo,
plus Assured Destruction [4:102]. One of the major recommendations
of the Damage Limiting study was that, once a good warhead/silo was
available, it was better to proceed with qualitative improvements, rath-
er than with larger deployments. Among other things, OSD commenced
an ICBM clean-up in early 1964 [39] and phased out the ATLAS and
TITAN I ICBMs during the CY. TITAN IIs were also slated for decom-
The additional 100-150 MM were for Defense Suppression (in lieu of
SKYBOLT) [5]
missioning as attrition "took its toll" [18:6]. (However the TITANs
are still in place. ) 6 At any rate, it was decided to equip MM Wing VI
with the MINUTEMAN II, and move for the earliest possible MINUTE-
MAN II retrofit into other wings (as opposed to deploying Wing VII).
The Damage Limiting study also cast some doubt on the utility
of bombers [4:241]. As noted, bombers are not acceptable for prompt
CF as are ICBMs, and there are major problems associated with with-
holding and recycling aircraft during a graduated war, to which SSBNs
are not subject. Bombers run up large personnel and O&M tabs and
also can "cost" a fair number of friendly RVs in virtual attrition for de-
fense suppression. Nor are bombers necessarily flexible weapons. It
has been contended that Senior U. S. Air Force and OSD officials felt
that McNamara desired an end to a large bomber force and that he plan-
ned to let the force decay by attrition. [4:44, 156]
McNamara's actions surely support this argument. McNamara
cancelled the B-58 program in October 1962 after only 90 of a planned
290 aircraft had been delivered. 8 More important, he terminated
B-52 output at the planned figure of 744 aircraft, and vetoed a USAF
proposal to buy some more airplanes. Both the B/RS-70 and X-20
programs were cancelled.
The B/RS combat mission was better done by ICBMs, argued
OSD [5:244-47] and it was proposed that a wing of SR-71s be procured
for the post-strike reconnaissance mission. DYNA-SOAR was replaced
with MOL (Manned Orbital Laboratory). SKYBOLT was cancelled;
HOUND DOG procurement stopped at about 630 missiles, and SRAM
was initiated in 1964 to replace it. 9 The B-47 phaseout, briefly delay-
ed because of tensions over Cuba and Berlin, was completed by Febru-
ary, 1966. Although the FY65 Annual Report indicated that future
bomber options included AMSA and FB-111, the FY66 Report cast of-
ficial doubt on the role and value of bombers [66:38]. 10
For all of these reasons, bomber strength fell off rapidly.
[Figure four] However, not even McNamara could undercut JSTPS'
war plans by reducing the number of weapons available for use in
the then-anticipated SIOP (by lowering the number of warheads in
the arsenal for certain missions). One solution was the fractiona-
tion of B-52 bomb payloads; USAF apparently equipped most planes
with 4 small B-57/B-61 bombs instead of 2 of the higher yield B-28/
B-53 bombs. 1 Also, McNamara was able to trade off bombers for
ICBM warheads, on account of MIRV. For example, in 1965,
McNamara proposed a phaseout of about 345 B-52s (mods B/C/D/E/
F) to leave a residual force of some 255 or 260 G/Hs. SAC was re-
ported to have expressed concern that such a move would undercut
SIOP coverage by reducing numbers of available warheads [4:183]. In
exchange for the 345 airplane drawdown, the Air Force requested 490
FB-111s. McNamara compromised with 210 FB-111s and 350 3-MIRVd
MMIII. In each case, the warhead count was identical. Here is an
excellent example of force structure being driven by targets and war
plans, subject to the top-line Assured Destruction constraints.
In fact, when the "Assured Destruction"-committed SSBN force
is excluded from consideration, the consistency of weapons available
for "military" use aboard U.S.A.F. ICBMs and bombers is remarkable.
SEA employment affected B-52 levels.
490 FBs x 4 SRAM/bomb = 1960 warheads; 350 x 3 MINUTEMAN III
+ 210 x 4 FB warheads = 1890 warheads. 5. 5 B-52 weapons (4 inter-
nal carriage plus average of 1. 5 outboard SRAM) x 345 = 1898 war-
heads. The reader will recall that AMSA was also expected by USAF
in the near future.
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Figure five reveals the trend in force loadings and milestone force
structure decisions used to counteract inventory deterioration. The
force sizing history described in Figure five is analogous to a ther-
mostat which seeks a warhead comfort level of about 1750-1800 and
which activates the furnace when levels fall below 1600 alert/reliable
weapons.
As we shall see in the next section and in Chapter III, it is the
requirement that U.S. forces be able to cover a baseline target list
that has been the basis of key procurement and upgrade decisions
since the late 1950s. When asked whether MIRV was developed as a
response to Soviet ABM, J. Foster (DDRE) said in 1968
"Not entirely. The MIRV concept was originally gene-
rated to increase our targeting capability rather than
to penetrate ABM defenses. In 1961-62 planning for
targeting the Minuteman force, it was found that the
total number of aim points exceeded the number of
Minuteman missiles. (MIRV) allowed us to cover these
targets with . . . fewer missiles."
[47:21]
The rationale for the M-X in fact has been given as the insurance of
continued SIOP coverage by the ICBM leg of the TRIAD [see 41]. Evi-
dently, the figure 200 x 10 weapons that the USAF has in mind for the
M-X program are based on the one-for-one replacement of unreliable
MINUTEMAN II and III warheads by M-X weapons. [92]
As a rule, then, force structure changes as (i) targets change;
(ii) SOF performance changes. There is one kicker though. The ex-
tent to which force structure can satisfy the requirements for force
structure response is subject to a top-line SOF procurement budget.
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CONCLUSIONS
This brief "history" suggests three very important force sizing
axioms. First, the definition of A. D. appears to have been based on
the capabilities of forces-in-being and programmed by 1962-63; "A. D."
was the spigot by means of which McNamara was able to turn off the
strategic buildup commenced by President Kennedy in 1961. This con-
tradicts the widely held impression that forces were built on the basis
of an a priori quantitative characterization of the utility of Assured De-
struction as an adequate deterrent based on enemy capabilities and per-
ceptions.
Second, strategic operations were planned within the nominal
A. D. constraints according to traditional target selection and employ-
ment planning rules. Kugler cites an interview with a Senior-DoD of-
ficial to this effect [4:235], and other evidence also supports this con-
tention. Thus the 1200 net EMT of a canonical A.D. /TRIAD structure
did not exist primarily as a hedge against "failure of one leg" (and as
insurance against the possibility that 400 EMT might not be deliverable
onto U/I targets). The criterion was a force sizing rule of thumb, with
no relationship to the size of target systems, the attributes required by
U.S. forces, and the plans which would coordinate U.S. strategic em-
ployment in a war.
Alain Enthoven testified in 1968 that an excess of warheads
generated by assured destruction permitted wide coverage of military
targets, just as had been the case before the invention of A. D. The
FY75 Annual Report suggests that U.S. planning's purpose "is not to
provide an independent assured destruction capability in each element
of the (TRIAD)" [75:49].
Third, and most important of all, the trend in force structure
planning has been based on increasingly ambiguous principles. No
SecDef since McNamara has said what a U.S. "assured destruction"
attack (much less other options) should seek to accomplish. Clark
Clifford said that the effectiveness of the U.S. SNFs was gauged by
"their ability, even after absorbing a well-coordinated surprise strike,
to inflict unacceptable damage on the attacker" (69]; Melvin Laird said
that deterrence hinged on "an adequate second strike capability" [71];
Donald Rumsfeld said that deterrence was based on "assured retalia-
tion, " which demanded tne ability to wreak "irreparable damage" on
Soviet targets [77]. The most useless statement of U.S. strategic
force sizing requirements of them all was made at a time when strenu-
ous initiatives were being made to discover rationales for new forces,
and new capabilities for existing forces:
"There is an absolute point beyond which our forces must
not be allowed to go. That is the level of sufficiency.
Above or at that level, our defense forces protect nation-
al security adequately. Below that level is one vast undif-
ferentiated area of no security at all. For it serves no
purpose in conflicts between nations to have been almost
strong enough."
[26:167]
Incredibly, this was the extent of the problem posed by the President
to the Congress--which is responsible for approving force structure
decisions.
Clearly, this "retreat from specificity" is based on the judg-
ment and experience of successive SecDefs since McNamara that care-
ful expression of strategic goals, either quantitatively [e. g. "200
cities"], or qualitatively [e. g. "destroy viability"] can only lead to
demands for more forces. [Conversely, it is very difficult for even
a "constraining" rule like A. D. to succeed, since manipulation of re-
liability and other data can synthetically increase force requirements.
After 1966, for example, McNamara both had to dilute and deempha-
size Assured Destruction as a rule, despite his invocation of the
"greater than expected threat" rule which sought to place a floor
under reliability data.] This was the case with Counterforce in
1961-62; with Damage Limitation in 1964; with "flexible options"
in 1973-74. It has also been apparent that a warhead demand was
created by the NSDM-242 (April 1974) "anti-recovery" guidance
which sought to obtain a reliable capability to "retard significantly
the ability of the U.S. S. R. to recover from a nuclear exchange and
regain the status of a 20th century military and industrial power
more quickly than the U.S." [77] Lame-duck Rumsfeld left behind
in the SecDef's office an albatross when he suggested that "8500"
weapons would be needed to implement the anti-recovery scheme.
But, according to Conover [19:18], "it has been recently reported
that Harold Brown is moving away from the anti-recovery concept
because it is too ambiguous and could b' used to justify enormous
increases in the nuclear forces." Brov n also removed the only
specific CV force index he had used, the 200 cities criterion, be-
tween his FY79 and FY80 Reports. Despite a brief attempt at RV
conservation--Brown toured the U.S. during 1978 and delivered
some excellent speeches on the fallacy of relying too heavily on
the'arbitrary numerology advanced to support proposals for force
increases" -he has returned to the inane force sizing rule of "Es-
sential Equivalence" which in effect puts force sizing decisions in
the hands of the enemy, and only ensures that we will at best
mirror-image his mistakes in our own posture (if we do anything
at all). Brown also has seemed to support some of the new target-
ing initiatives designed to cope with the genuinely distressing deve-
Speeches given in San Francisco (23 June 78) and in New York
(13 September 78) among others.
lopments in the Soviet target base to be noted in Chapter III; in this
regard, the Secretary appears to see the ALCM as the solution to
most if not all force structure problems. We will return to this point
in Chapter IV, but I wish to note here that force sizing has seemed,
since 1959, to have taken leave of the target base (and therefore be-
come disconnected from war plans); after 1968, even the arbitrary
structuring rules set by McNamara have been abandoned. Let me
now turn to a review of the implications of this trend for force em-
ployment.
ANALYSIS
As the preceeding account indicates, U.S. strategic force siz-
ing since 1963 has been a matter of attempting to satisfy certain stra-
tegic criteria within the constraints imposed by OSD fiat at that time.
By mid-1961 it is said that President Kennedy and SecDef McNamara
had fixed ultimate force size (with tne e :ception of an option on a
seventh MINUTEMAN wing) [4], and by FY63 all projected strategic
ballistic SNDVs were either in-hand, in serial production or program-
med (with long lead items more or less completely funded.)12 And on
26 October 1962, SAC took delivery of the 744th B-52, marking the end
of the production of strategic B-bombers which had proceeded without
interruption since 1946 (and which has been dormant since that time).
Thus, the net historical constitution of each leg of the TRIAD by SNDV
type has been "frozen" for some time, as Figure six indicates. 13
Although launcher levels have been consistent since FY64 (with
some decrease, since FY67, in bomber TAI), there have been materi-
al changes within SNDV categories. The most prominent result of
what is usually called "force modernization" has been a substantial
jump in warhead loadings as shown in Figure 7 (on a page following).
FIGURE SIX
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This is the result of SNDV "fractionation" accomplished over the last
fifteen years. 550 MINUTEMAN have been converted to a MIRV capa-
bility of up to three RVs per ICBM, and 496 of the 656 POLARIS tubes
have been reequipped with POSEIDON missiles each carrying an aver-
age of 10 RVs. Bombers have been "MIRV-ed" as well since 1961, as
larger numbers of smaller gravity bombs were placed on aircraft, as
were the HOUND DOG and SRAM ASMs (with deployment of each com-
mencing in 1961 and 1971 respectively). By design, net U.S. force
megatonnage has fallen radically, as has (to a lesser extent) equivalent
megatonnage (due to the relatively small average size of the warheads
in the current U.S. arsenal).
This section will examine the extent of the impact on U.S. SNFs
of payload fractionation. It is frequently contended in this regard that
tne main purpose and leading consequence of warhead proliferation has
been an expansion in the scope of the U. 3. 's basic strategic mission
objectives. The questions of improved command and control or great-
er planning flexibility aside, it is often argued that the addition of so-
and-so many extra weapons increases the list of cities or other tar-
gets scheduled for attack in nuclear war. If this were to be the case,
then the growth of the U.S. warhead arsenal would imply major
changes in U.S. strategic operational planning, regardless of the con-
sistency of the SNDV inventory. However the claim does not bear
close examination. Extra RVs have at no time represented an oppor-
tunity for an overall "qualitative" breakout for U.S. employment op-
tions within the framework of U. S. SNF sizing rules which are based
on the extent and nature of the targets these weapons must cover.
While an increase in our warhead "census" can facilitate flexibility in
operations, I will argue here that the seeming fulmination of U.S. war-
head loadings does not represent any appreciable change with respect
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to our canonical force sizing practises and, further, that our capabili-
ties in the aggregate have remained constant despite this increase in
reentry vehicles and bombs.
This is for two reasons bearing on Assured Destruction and
countersilo operations which derive from a frequently ignored but
crucial technical feature of fractionation: namely the fact that for a
given level of warhead design sophistication, the overall EMT which
can be carried by a ballistic missile of fixed throwweight is constant.14
Further, because, MIRV made possible the execution of multiple "sor-
ties" by a missile (a characteristic theretofore unique to bombers)
MIRVed ballistic missiles can be used to cover an expanding target
base without requiring more SNDVs. The nature of the targeting issues
involved (and the effectiveness of these forces) is described in detail
in Chapter III. For the moment we shall examine the evolution of U. S.
SNF capabilities according to two arbiti ary rules:
.U.S. ICBM RVs shall be used to cover the Soviet ICBM tar-
get base using either"one (or two) shots per silo" as an attack
planning guideline. ICBM targets shall be attacked until all
targets are covered or until all warheads are expended. We
reserve the option of adding bomber warheads to insufficient-
ly covered targets.
.We desire an SSBN force which is sized according to the 400
reliable EMT rule for urban/industrial attacks or an "assured
destruction" strike.
First, consider the silo coverage problem. The evolution of
this Soviet target base is shown in Figure eight. We ignore in this
analysis related targets such as LCFs and reload bunkers (which we
would be interested in attacking under actual circumstances). Omit-
ting any consideration of reliability, availability, or prelaunch sur-
vivability, we can apply our historical ICBM force to all or parts of
the Soviet target.base as shown (for both one and two shots per silo)
in Figure nine. If, in the case of a two shot per silo attack, we wish-
ed to cover the target base thoroughly we could expend bomber forces
for this purpose. However, after 1968, using a bomber availability
factor of . 3 or . 4, all alert and surviving bomber RVs must be com-
mitted to silo targets, and in each case, we still cannot cover all tar-
gets with a reliable two shots per silo. To do so with ICBMs would
require the procurement of a large number of new ICBM warheads.
Two options (whici, again, do not include reliability, survivability,
etc.) for achieving this capability are:
PAVE PEPPER M-X
2 x1600 2 x1600
2 x1600 = 458 SNDVs 100- 320 SNDVs7 10
Sized-down versions of both options are now (or recently have been) un-
der consideration as means for providing baseline Soviet silo coverage.
It is amply clear in this case that an increase in U.S. ICBM RVs-on-
station has failed to keep pace with the growth of their designated tar-
gets.
Let us turn now to the 400 EMT reliable SSBN force. The his-
torical "capabilities" of this force are described in Figure ten. Note
that only with the full 31 boat Poseidon retrofit has a full on-station
complement of 400 EMT become available. Only as C-4 and D-5
come on line will EMTage per SLBM exceed unity by any margin.
I now combine both of these factors to describe the net change
in U.S. strategic capability measured by warheads. Suppose that we
are willing to accept only as many shots per silo and as much EMT as
missile reliability is excluded
FIGURE EIGHT
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are available aboard unattrited, perfectly reliable ICBMs and on-
station SLBMs, -respectively. We assume therefore that no bombs
or ASMs are committed to either silo targets or to the satisfaction
of an adequate single 400-EMT capability. Figure eleven indicates
that the U.S. supply of "discretionary" warheads, in this example
all bomber weapons, has remained remarkably constant since forces
were fixed in 1963. Were we to spend some bomber warheads against
silos, against related LCF and related RVSN targets, or to "flesh out"
the 400 EMT capability of the SSBN forces especially prior to 1967,
there would be many fewer available bomber weapons. It is clear,
within the bounds of these arbitrary force sizing "procedures" that the
U.S. strategic nuclear force structure has changed little over time
measured in warheads as well as in SNDVs.
BUDGETS AND FORCES
Only to a very limited extent do force structure decisions drive
budget levels for military activities.16 On the other hand, the reverse
causality--the centrality of the budget as a force sizing tool--describes
well the history of SNF planning especially from about 1963 to the pres-
ent. With the exception of a very few major procurement efforts, the
U.S. SNF structure necessarily has resided in "impoverished" condi-
tions, at least relative to the popular image of runaway strategic spend-
ing. What amounts to budget "redlining" has forced planners, among
other things: to upgrade current forces rather than replace forces; to
spend substantial sums to buy "continuously available options, " (to be
activated should a future radical deterioration in world order demand
large new procurement, as opposed to buying useable, fieldable capa-
bilities constantly over some planning horizon); and to accept many
actual and even more potential inefficiencies as a penalty for deferring
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To date these tactics have been relatively effective as compen-
satory instruments. Constraints on SNF spending have helped to per-
mit increased funding levels for other Federal programs, both civil
and military. And none of our "options" became necessary as a con-
sequence of explosive and dangerous external developments. As the
slack for further marginal improvements to existing systems is
stretched taut, however, we will need to consider a partial reverse
of the strongest limitation on the U. S. SNFs: the Program 1 budget.
When J. F. Kennedy became President, the U.S. had spent
for several years an average of about $30 billion a year in FY80 $ on
a variety of strategic programs. Two centerpieces of our strategic
programs up through 1960 led to especially high funding levels. These
were:
operation, maintenance, procurement, and improvement of
both offensive and defensive aircraft and related systems;
diverse and high risk R & D pursuits in a variety of areas
It is difficult to conceive of any activity that requires the ines-
capable high funding of aircraft operations. We may elect silo-based,
rather than rail or air-mobile MINUTEMAN, but no such luxuries are
generic to bombers and fighters. Aircraft are expensive to buy and
operate. Costly improvements constantly must be made to keep bomb-
er and interceptor squadrons ready to deal with a sophisticated threat.
Adjuncts to aerospace operations such as radars, tankers, and the like
are not cheap. Personnel involved with aircraft operations--pilots,
crews, mechanics, controllers--need special, intensive and constant
training, and command proportionately higher pay. R and D similarly
consumes expensive resources, including the greatest "luxury" item
of the U.S. defense budget: manpower. Unless aerospace operating
budgets keep vigorously in step with inflation--and they haven't--opera-
tional expenses can bankrupt a military air force. As Table twelve
shows strikingly, the impact of inflation on manpower and operations
can be a powerful determinant of strategic force sizing.
TABLE TWELVE
COST IN FY80 $ PER SQUADRON OF AIRCRAFT
(BOMBER AND INTERCEPTOR)







After his election, President Kennedy and SecDef McNamara
carefully reassessed U.S. forces and objectives with a view towards
sufficient capability at reasonable cost. Despite the major strategic
build-up ordered by the President, requested funding for SNFs actu-
ally dropped, mainly because systems with lower life-cycle costs (es-
pecially MINUTEMAN) were substituted for manpower/ capital/O&M-
intensive bomber and interceptor fleets. Further, during Secretary
McNamara's tenure, many programs proposed for development and
procurement were cancelled, and prompt and substantial phaseouts
17'
of extant forces were accomplished.
Yet demands for austerity could not end there. The President
recognized that conventional and other defense programs were ignored
only at U.S. peril, and more important, that the country would be
more threatened by the economic problems linked with unchecked de-
fense spending than by any foreign adversary. Because the DoD bud-
get constitutes fully 75 per cent of the Federal government's discre-
tionary authority, and because of other urgent pressures on Federal
budgets, the DoD has decreased over time as a component of the
Federal budget; moreover, DoD has "footed" part of the bill due as
a result of growth in other government activities and has grown much
less quickly than the Federal budget in general.
FIGURE THIRTEEN
DEFENSE AS A SHARE OF (%):
FY GNP FEDERAL OUTLAY ALL PUBLIC OUTLAY
64 8.3 41.8 28.1
68 9.4 42.5 29.2
72 6.9 31.7 20.6
76 5.7 24.4 16.4
80 4.9 23.1 14.9
Source [77][78][80]
Given the general trend in DoD real "growth," the current burden of in-
flation, and the Carter administration's plan for a balanced budget, I
assume in this analysis that a major reorientation in national policy
is a prerequisite for change in DoD TOA.
Within the 10 DoD programs, Program 1, the Strategic Nuclear
Forces has with respect to DoD spending played a role similar to that
of the DoD within Federal Budget as a whole. Thus, when other priori-
ties arise, Program One (together with some other activities, especial-
ly Program 6, Research and Development) are used, in effect, as the
discretionary portion of DoD's TOA. The decline of Program 1 TOA
over time is shown in Figure 14. This reflects, among other things,
the influence of the SEA priority on the Defense budget, but note that
Program 1 has failed to "recover" even after the termination of the
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Indochina war. From this trend, it is clear that Program 1 can only
show a real increase if its contribution to net DoD TOA is increased
by a rate appreciably above inflation.
Let's turn now to the Program one accounts themselves. We
may distinguish between three missions: Strategic Offensive Forces,
Strategic Defensive Forces, and Strategic C3 and Intelligence. (I will
group Strategic "Miscellaneous" -- a line item appearing in the FY79
FAD--with SC 3I in this analysis.) As Table 15 reveals, Program one
has not changed at all in terms of the major systems and capabilities
it supports for some time. Over time, the relative share of Program
One allocated to each activity has evolved as shown in Figure 16. The
most obvious trend is the decrease in SDF TOA; first, by 1968, as a
result of the large-scale phase out of ADC/ANG squadrons and ADC's
BOMARC B and ARADCOM's Nike-Hercules and HAWK firing batteries;
and after 1968 until it was cancelled, th SAFEGUARD program.
Using Figure Five and Historica, FYDP [2] data, it is possible
to estimate the components of Program one for offensive forces (SOFs).
The accounting categories: Military Personnel, Operations and Main-
tenance, Procurement, RDT & E, and Military Construction and Hous-
ing, are broken out in Figure 17. An interesting characteristic of
these accounts is the constancy, in percentage terms of the ratio of
combined (MilPers + O&M + MilCon/Hsg) to Total Prog 1 (Offense)
TOA. Over FY62-77, the three average 48. 7% of net Offensive TOA;
since FY76 when the SDF drawdown bottomed out, their average con-
tribution to Offensive TOA is 50. 7%. Because these categories are
extremely sensitive to CPI, fuel cost, and other fact-of-life price in-
creases, it follows that, unless Program 1 (offense) keeps pace with
current prices increase, a drawndown in operational units has proba-
bly occurred, as Program one (offense) is one of the few defense ac-
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tivities where readiness cannot (or at least should not) be traded off
for, say, procurement or for price increases. 18
With the exception of a slight MilCon contribution to the TRI-
DENT base construction at King's Bay GA and Mangor WA, none of
the 50. 7% attributable to the three accounts listed above is available
for new procurement or for RDT & E. For all intents and purposes,
a relatively constant 50% of our SOF TOA is "gated" and unavailable
for modernizing old and buying new systems. This being the case, we
can assess the ability of the Program 1 (Offense) TOA budget to sus-
tain the kind of expenses associated with and generated by new and on-
going force modernization programs.
First, I wish to make a distinction between "upgrade" and "new"
programs. Upgrade programs are programmed independently of new
activities and include relatively routine force modernization, major
subsystem procurement (e. g. SRAM, o> MIRV, the purpose of which is
to enhance the capabilities of existing Si4DVs), and also R & D programs
with constant funding trends (such as ABRES). "New programs" ar e
defined here specifically to refer to new, follow-on SNDV development
and procurement programs. The ability of Program 1 (offense) to bear
the burden of "new" programs is therefore equivalent to our ability to
finance such major programs as TRIDENT, B-1, M-X, etc.
Upgrade TOAs, for four activities appearing in the DoD Annual
Report's "Selected Major Programs" are listed for FY71-80 in Table
18.
It is important to note that upgrades are programmed indepen-
dently of major new activities. For example, a comprehensive 1969
B-52 modification study laid the groundwork for a $1 billion upgrade
of the B-52's ECM and penetration capabilities, for all SAC operation-
al mods (D/G/H). Although this program seems competitive (in a
FIGURE EIGHTEEN
ACTUAL TOA FOR SELECTED UPGRADE PROGRAMS
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77 78 79 80
87 74 157
1196 1520 1355 1123 1019 1053 570 130 131
2075 1264 1159 504 251
171 156 154 140
119 54 31 17 17
168 186 253 238 377





budgetary sense) with B-1 procurement. Congress was told that the
program would do and cost the same, regardless of the outcome of
the B-1 decision:
"As far as B-52s are concerned, cancellation of the B-1
had absolutely no effect on our near-term ECM plans . . .
The B-1 (cancellation) allowed, if not forced us to look
again at the long-term B-52 ECM planning that we had
not previously addressed . .
That is to say, the postponement of B-1 serial production merely ac-
celerated the requirements for fielding B-52 ECM improvements (53:
18].
Also programmed upgrades are "reliable", that is, TOA "pro-
posed for authorization, " "proposed," and "planned" are relatively un-
changed as they move in from outyear projections towards actual TOA.
Hence, when an upgrade-type program is planned, there is a predict-
able impact on funding available for new programs. Since for the
years under consideration, upgrades cc istitute from a fourth to virtual-
ly all of Program 1 (offense) procurement, it is immediately evident
that upgrading comes at the expense of major follow-on and new pro-
grams, unless programmed follow-ons are matched by a real jump in
Offensive TOA. And, in fact, "Selected Major Programs" entries sug-
gest that such increases must be in the works, since outyear program
costs are obviously too big for a relatively fixed $4 Billion for Offen-
sive Procurement & RDT&E. That new programs, not upgrades, suf-
fer the consequences of a procurement ceiling is evident in Figure 19.
In another format, Annual Reports for FY77, 78, and 80 feature
projected Outyear Program One budgets: in the FY77 and 78 budgets
outyear upswings principally represent a piggybacking of M-X, TRI-
DENT, and B-1. Other Program One funding history is superimposed.






















































































ways just out of reach. Mr. Paul Warnke's expression "Apes on a
Treadmill" is au excellent description of Program one planning: the
lead ape is, of course, "intended" TOA, and it is being pursued by
actual authority. (See Figure 20)
Finally, it is essential to note that the TOA figures for Pro-
curement appearing in this chapter do not, for the most part, corres-
pond to outlays as Figure 21 shows. Most of this disparity results
from SCN (TRIDENT) problems, and some of it was caused by the ano-
malous impact of the B-1 cancellation. It is probable that some of the
procurement-related TOA is reprogrammed into operational and man-
power expenses as well.
With this in mind, we need ask what is the ability of the U. S.
to support new programs over the period, say, FY81--FY90. Most
people are optimistic. Mr. Paul Nitze recommends a strategic catch-
up program consisting, among other things, of MARV, 10000 MPS
shelters, M-X, B-1 and related projects. This, he avers, could be
done at "costs that would increase the strategic arms budget marginal-
ly above present levels." [44. 208] In a Congressional Budget Office
paper, four options for U.S. counterforce capability are hypothesized.
From 1979-2000 these would cost, in FY 80 $:
Finite Deterrence = $126. 8 = $6. 0 Billion/year
Slow Counterforce = $143. 1 = $6.8 Billion/year
Prompt CF = M - X = $155. 5 = $7.4 Billion/year
Prompt CF (Trident) = $159. 5 = $7. 6 Billion/year
The report adds that "costs shown do not include all the costs of main-
taining the strategic forces. Not included are the costs of such func-
tions as command, control, communications; surveillance; and strate-
gic defense. " [14:xvii]. And, on a somber note, Mr. Warnke has warn-
ed that the price of failure to sign SALT II will be an added defense
/~~"c22ITVCVTY
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burden to the United States of from 5 to 6 Billion a year for at least a
decade for crash strategic program development. [55]
Whether the cost for such programs is "marginal" or admitted-
ly major, the following facts are clear:
. Trends point to continued low funding levels for Program One
Offense. Opportunities for one-time "cures" such as the
fighter/SAM phase-out executed by McNamara have been by
and large expended
.An increase in Program One funding sufficient to pay for
even one major procurement effort would involve a real in-
crease in funding materially above the rate of inflation
.Thus, it is likely that such increases in Program One procure-
ment could only come as either (i) the result of a radical re-
orientation of national priorities towards much improved de-
fenses, or (ii) the spoils available from scavenging other DoD
activities.
Pertinent to the subject of this thesis, the following facts are evident:
.At no time during the period FY63-present could we have af-
forded a major new program for the strategic forces
.That upgrading essential components of the TRIAD consumed
nearly all available procurement and RDT & E moneys.
.That "immediately available options" is the best defense policy
we could have employed under the circumstances.
Secretary Schlesinger described U. S. force structure planning best
when he said that:
"Shifting sands seems to be the best way to characterize
the strategic rationales of recent years. In 1961, the
suicidal implications of massive retaliation were under-
scored: the United States would be faced with a choice
between humiliation and holocaust. Interest then deve-
loped in damage-limiting and coercion. But there has
been little willingness to invest money in either.
[17:113]
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In Chapter III, we will turn to the question of force employment plan-
ning and we shall examine the implications of force structure for the
U.S. ability to execute its desired nuclear war plans. In Chapter IV,
we will ask the question: "Is the decay of U.S. force planning a seri-
ous matter? "
CHAPTER III: U.S. STRATEGIC EMPLOYMENT PLANNING
The basis for U.S. strategic nuclear employment planning is
incorporated in a set of nuclear war execution programs which have
been known, since 1960, as the SIOP [Single Integrated Operational
Plan]. The SIOP is literally the gear between national "strategy" and
the Strategic Offensive Forces. For this reason, every debate on
"retargeting, " "doctrine, " and the like is in essence a discussion of
the options which should be contained in SIOP and the way in which
those options should be executed. Ironically, the SIOP is so tightly
held that most of the participants in various controversies have no
idea of how declared operational reforms will change the employment
statusguo ante (nor how reforms would be implemented) and those who
are familiar with the plan have not volunteered substantive input to the
public debate. With this caveat in mind, I shall speculate here on
some likely aspects of SIOP's evolution and its relation to force plan-
ning.
SIOP is planned on the basis of a set of U.S. military objectives
for nuclear war contingencies decided upon by the President and the
SecDef. The capabilities deemed essential by the NCA are articulated
in guidance which is issued to JCS. The guidance will include objectives
which might be paraphrased colloquially as "we desire the ability to
launch an attack against Soviet ICBMs with such-and-such an expecta-
tion of damage," "twe want a plan which will black out the European
Soviet Union, " and "should worse come to worst, we should be able
to unleash a sufficiently effective attack which will be capable of de-
stroying the U.S.S.R. as a viable twentieth century entity."
The JCS then elaborates on the specific requirements of SIOP
in order to render tne national guidance compatible with other U. S.
war plans, especially plans for theater contingencies. A list of re-
quirements is then issued to the commander of JSTPS, whose job it
is to oversee the detailed translation of the guidance into practical
war plans. The commander of JSTPS supervises the design of the
SIOP and heads a "governing board" which makes decisions on speci-
fic problems encountered by the various technical staffs which work
on the different components of the Plan, (such as a target staff, a
mission planning staff, and so on). The resulting plans are simulated
and the necessary revisions are made. After approval, the latest
plan presumably is promulgated to operational units.
Practically speaking, the core of tne SIOP design process is
the categorization and "pigeon-holing" of certain types of targets.
JSTPS maintains an up-to-date TDI which lists some 25, 000 or more
targets, together with vulnerability data and geodetic coordinates.
The TDI probably is organized according to some principal target at-
tribute, such as function. We would then be able to select out of the
TDI all silos, all refineries, all railroad marshalling yards, or all
police stations. Each target category is subcategorized according to
various data and priorities. An entry for the Ufa refinery might show,
for example, that it is the U.S.S.R. 's largest refinery, that it repre-
sents 6. 5% of the U.S.S.R. 's entire refining capacity, that it is in the
Bashkin A Oblast, near Kuybyshev, that it is colocated with a city of
750, 000 people, that it is not near any military targets, but that it is
colocated with some other industries. We would also desire some
data of the relative importance of a particular target to other econo-
mic, military or administrative activities. We would want to know
that the destruction of Ufa would not immediately influence a European
battle, nor would this impact on Sino-Soviet operations, but that its
destruction could have major implications for nearby shipbuilding in-
dustries. [52] [43] Finally, we'd like to know "how essential is the
prompt destruction of this target?", and so on.
We would then select relevant targets to prepare the options
required by the SecDef's guidance. Consider a plan to destroy 80% of
the U.S. S. R. 's refining capability. We would extract the relevant
entries from the TDI, develop force requirements and devise a lay-
down capable of producing the requisite damage with specified confi-
dence. We might also develop a menu of attack plans, so that a dif-
ferent mix of SNDVs could be used should circumstances so demand.
Within an option, we might also have suboptions. It might be desirable,
for example, to trade off some attack effectiveness (by raising height
of burst or moving to lower yield weapons) in order to produce as lit-
tle collateral damage as possible. We might desire to conduct a par-
ticularly dirty attack. We might wish to restrict our attack on refineries
to installations in particular geographic regions. We might wish to time
the arrival of weapons to take advantage of some advantage or other, or
to secure the negotiating advantage of "threatening death by a thousand
cuts instead of by a single blow."
Because the SIOP is an integrated plan, we would have to exa-
mine each option with respect to its implications for executing subse-
quent attacks without degradation. It is necessary to plan fall-back
and retargeting protocols for employment should a weapong (or group
of weapons, such as a SSBN) dedicated to one or more LNOs be destroy-
ed and to determine which options should be substituted for others if one
particular package is unavailable or unsuitable.
According to this hypothetical method of SIOP preparation, his-
torical evolution in employment doctrine could be gauged in terms of
changing guidance; in terms of the relative priority accorded different
target categories; by reviewing historical C 3-related preparations; by
comparing the degree to which less than full SIOP options are refined
in terms of extent and quality of specified objectives. Since little infor-
mation is available publicly, it is necessary to trace the SIOP's history
in terms of declaratory U.S. *policy. There is no guarantee, however,
that declared strategic objectives reflect actual U.S. targeting plans.
HISTORICAL REVIEW
The first U.S. emergency war plan, HALFMOON, is said to
have been approved by the JCS in 1948. [35:33] HALFMOON constituted
A-bomb attacks on targets in 20 Soviet cities by D+60. 2 U.S. plans be-
came more ambitious with the increased availability of weapons, but
increased force loadings merely expanded and did not change U.S. tar-
geting. Apparently, after 1951 (when an adequate reserve of fissile ma-
terials was ensured), planners could not find much practical difference
between different kinds of targets, because of a seeming limitation on
weapons yields. 3 [Thus, up until 1951, no research had been done on
the problem of fallout, mainly because it was planned that all weapons
would be burst at high altitudes to maximize the area covered by low
levels of blast. ]
The availability of Hydrogen bombs, together with a perceived
growth in the Soviet strategic nuclear capabilities, led to a paradoxi-
cal development in U.S. war planning. On 30 October 1953 Admiral
Radford presented NSC 162/2 to an NSC meeting outlining the New
Look. On 12 January 1954, J. F. Dulles described the plan in his
"massive retaliation" speech. Although massive retaliation tends
to be associated with attacks seeking mainly or entirely to cause coun-
tervalue damage [see 9], the target list was in fact organized into
three distinct classes: DELTA (Countervalue); BRAVO (Counterforce);
and ROMEO (which were attacks designed to impede the advance of
Soviet forces into Western Europe-- analogous to NOP.) Until the
U.S. weapons stockpile began to grow at a brisk rate (1953-54), USAF
doctrine emphasized relatively precise strikes on specific objectives
in urban areas. In fact, the limited Soviet power generation system
seemed an ideal target in the early 1950s; (it should be remembered that
these targets were considered counterforce because of their contribution
to military production). 5 The availability of H-bombs permitted a
slackening in the obligations for precise targeting. Whereas before it
had been necessary to select aim points with care, a high-yield Hydro-
gen weapon (the lethal radius of which exceeded by a significant frac-
tion the area of many targets even with the most pessimistic assump-
tions about delivery accuracy) made agonizing over specific targets un-
necessary. Although USAF did not seek Soviet fatalities as an objective,
to go after a particular military target in an urban area involved devas-
tating the entire city. Regardless of on( 's choice of attack criteria, lay-
downs involving forces such as these did not require refined attack plan-
ning, and the situation might be described as "wild. However,
"By 1954 it was apparent to some Rand corporation analysts
that increased attention should be given to BRAVO targets--
one prescient study argued, for example, that "with the
steady expansion in our fissile material stockpile . . . we
might be able to turn our attention to such worthy objects as
counterforce targets, which become increasingly worthy as
the Russian stockpile increases. "Arid in the mid-1950s, as
American stockpiles grew and "as Soviet airpower came to
be recognized as the chief threat to NATO, " the emphasis
of American targeting policy shifted to counterforce [i. e.
discriminate] targeting. In 1957, at a meeting at (HqSAC),
Curtis E. LeMay requested the "development of a Modus Oper-
andi (for) the defeat of communist air power."
[20:10]
In fact, the Optimum Mix targeting plan of the 1950s already did in-
clude a heavy loading of military aim-points; the "prescient" but un-
referenced Rand study may have been thinking about ICBMs, and Le-
May may have been thinking of SAMOS instead of some new targeting
scheme as his "Modus Operandi. " [50] However, the point is well
taken here that increased precision in target planning was a necessary
corollary to an increased emphasis on high confidence destruction of
"communist" air power.
The fact remains that the U.S. policy of Massive Retaliation did
not place any particular burden on U.S. war planning staffs. Up until
1960, the Joint Chiefs of Staff's JSCP consisted of a single plan. Once
the Emergency War Order had been issued to alert U.S. forces by the
President, all aircraft and missiles would be launched promptly against
their targets with no possibility of recall. There were no planning pro-
blems such as are posed by limited attacks, by withholding forces, and
the like. At one point, Air Force and Navy plans did not even take into
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account the nuclear weapons of the other service. The massive U. S.
blow would devastate Communist military forces and would kill some-
think like 360-525 million Soviet, Chinese and Bloc citizens.
In late 1959, however, President Eisenhower directed the Net-
Evaluation Sub-Committee of the National Security Council to study
problems associated with less than all-out attacks on urban areas.
The NESC study group, chaired by General Hickey, produced a pro-
posal for prioritized coverage of enemy strategic and other military
targets, advocating attacks on urban areas to the extent that warheads
were available after allocation to military targers. Accordingly a
new guidance, known as NSTAP (National Strategic Targeting Attack
Policy and Guidance) was issued to the newly created Joint Strategic
Target Planning Staff, which contained for the first time, representa-
tives of both U.S. strategic services. JSTPS produced the first SIOP
by November 1960. [20:17]
The New SIOP was given, according to Ball [20:12] five op-
tions, ranging along a spectrum of increasing "intensity;"
1) Counterforce targets
2) Area Air Defenses not located near cities
3) Air Defense in the vicinity of cities
4) Command and Control systems
5) All other (including U/I) targets
Also, "sub-options included such things as use of air/ground burst
weapons; clean/dirty bombs; larger/smaller warheads; civil defense/
evacuation. " Moreover, Soviet targets were separated, at least for
planning purposes from those of the Bloc and the PRC.
In addition, a number of committees and research organizations
reported on such subjects as C 3, more controllable MINUTEMAN
forces, and the like. As a result of some of these projects, a tighter
rein on MINUTEMAN launch, 8 development of EC-135 LOOKING GLASS
aircraft (first going airborne in 1961), procurement of an eight-entry
dialable MMII target select option, initiation of a new more accurate
Minuteman RV (the AVCO Mk-11), and the establishment of better inte-
gration of NCA with such new NORAD systems as BMEWS, were among
improvements directed.
The history of subsequent developments has been described
well elsewhere: I will limit further narrative observations to two key
points.
First, despite the rhetoric surrounding "Assured Destruction,"
U.S. strategic employment planning has always placed a heavy empha-
sis on covering military targets. As McNamara said at Ann Arbor on
16 June 62:
See references [4] [8] [19] [20]
"We are convinced that a general nuclear war target sys-
tem is individisble, and if, despite our efforts, nuclear
war should occur, our best hope lies in conducting a cen-
trally controlled campaign against all of the enemy's vi-
tal nuclear capabilities, ,while retaining reserve forces,
all centrally controlled.' T [1:114-120]
Apparently the focus, in SIOP preparation, on military targets has
changed little since 1962. Thus, during the Counterforce discussion
of 1974, "Schlesinger made it clear that the U. S. SIOP had always
included a heavy loading of military aim points on its various target
lists." [6:12] In 1974, Schlesinger said that "only a small fraction of
the more than 25, 000 targets contained in the strategic targeting plan
are cities. The majority of these targets include a wide range of
military objectives such as Soviet bomber bases and some missile
silos. " [32:38] Ball quotes a former Assistant Secretary of Defense
who said in 1971 that
"The SIOP has remained essenti lly unchanged since
(1962) . . . the targeting philosc phy, the options and
the order of choice remain unchanged from the McNamara
speech ... "[20:16-17]
The account goes on to note that a "two-star Air Force planner was
quite emphatic (in 1973) that the SIOP was 'never reworked under
(President) Johnson. It is still basically the same as 1962. "' Ball
also notes that "A recent study of Henry Kissinger actually castigates
the National Security Adviser for failing to 'energize the bureaucracy
to update the Joint Chiefs' War Plan (SIOP), a plan that has remained
essentially unchanged since 1962.
The second feature of importance is the change in the degree
of "articulation" of strategic options over time. Prior to the first
SIOP, the Emergency Action Plans envisioned the simultaneous at-
Even when speaking about C 3, it seems redundancy is necessary!
tack of all types of targets immediately upon the initiation of conflict.
But the NESC SIOP introduced the five graduated levels of strategic
attack noted supra, and McNamara sought to inject even more agility
into war plans: as McNamara said on 17 February 1962: "Our new
policy gives us the flexibility to choose among several operational
plans, but does not require that we make any advance commitment
with respect to doctrine or targets.'" Apparently, a redoubled empha-
sis on purely military options with minimum collateral damage was
part of the McNamara reforms: as the Assistant Secretary of Defense
interviewed by Ball also said, that following the renegation of the no-
cities strategy, "it has become more difficult to execute the pure
counterforce option." [20:16] Lambeth notes that in the McNamara
years special efforts were made to produce alternate laydowns for a
variety of contingencies, and that the "SIOP has, since 1961, comprised
more than a single big package. "9 [6:9] While hardware and C3 capa-
bilities permitted excursions from plans, noted Lambeth, these were
improvisational not codified--until 1973-74. As Secretary Schlesinger
himself said
"The first questionyou raised is whether we possess options
at the present time or possessed options previously. The
answer to that question is yes; we had a number of options
that had been built into our war plans, but all of these op-
tions were at a very high level which would have caused ma-
jor fatalities in the Soviet Union . . . However, if you ask
the people who do the SIOP planning, they will tell you that
we can always do selective strikes if that is what is wanted.
But there had not been a sufficient examination of the details
so that one could say definitively that we had practicable low-
level options. So one had an array of several options at the
upper end of the spectrum, each of which would have impos-
ed major damage on the Soviet Union."
[31:37]
Schlesinger has also said that SIOP's options consisted of
"massive preplanned strikes in which one would be dump-
ing literally thousands of weapons on the Soviet Union.
Some of these strikes could to some extent be withheld
from going directly against cities, but that was limited
even then. With mass.ive strikes of that sort, it would
be impossible to ascertain whether the purpose of a stra-
tegic strike was limited ornot. It was virtually indistin-
guishable from an attack on cities.
[32:9]
William Beecher disclosed in August 1972 that, although the SIOP was
limited to a few massive retaliatory strikes, only one of these actual-
ly called for attacks on Soviet cities: "current war plans continue to
list certain 'hard' targets . . . Several warheads are assigned to
each target. There are hundreds of such targets on the list. The U. S.
President actually has a wide choice of targets. He could go after
cities in a second strike, or he could go after, and confidently know he
would destroy, most remaining targets in Russia. " [20:17]
As Schlesinger said, "what the change in targeting does is give
the President . . . the option of limiting strikes down to a few wea-
pons. " [51] According to the Secretary, some of the options under
development "envisage strike packages of 'three to five weapons . . .
other Defense Department spokesmen have added that the overall tar-
geting reorientation involves a wide-ranging development of responses
'up and down the spectrum from one weapon all the way up to massive
use of weapons. "' [6:28] But, as Lambeth warns, "the key themes in-
volved in the policy, however, are not so much 'limitation' and 're-
straint' as they are 'flexibility, ' 'selectivity, ' and 'control. "'
We see that the requirements for target coverage have stayed
the same (or grown), while the acquisition of flexibility and control-
lability of forces has become essential. It is necessary to ask whether
the forces have kept pace with these demanding requirements. I turn
now to a consideration of the forces' abilities in this regard, and will
illustrate the matter by measuring the ability of U.S. forces to ac-
complish the strategic missions which would be called for under the
SIOP.
TARGETING: WHO GETS WHAT, WHEN, HOW
In the rest of this chapter, I will assess the ability of U.S.
SNFs to accomplish a variety of generic missions which are certainly
part of most U.S. SIOP variants. In general, U.S. capabilities have
decayed, and because of recent force planning decisions, it is proba-
ble that these trends will continue. As a result we will be increasing-
ly obliged either to accept large planning penalties due to inherent
U.S. force inefficiencies, or else to sacrifice certain strategic mis-
sions and capabilities.
The effectiveness of U.S. strategic nuclear forces is measured
according to their ability to survive a first strike and then to destroy
certain fractions of a variety of Soviet target systems, including stra-
tegic and other military, energy-producing, transportation, industrial,
etc. bases. In this analysis, I will allow deterrence "to fail, " and then
I will display (for different years when relevant) the results of a nucle-
ar exchange in terms of Soviet targets destroyed by U.S. forces. His-
torically speaking, a priori net assessment of most military capabili-
ties has been poor. There is little doubt in most people's minds that
the uncertainties and ambiguities in many aspects of nuclear operation-
al planning are sufficiently major that the results of "nuclear wars"
of the type described here may be tenuous and arguable. Some people
also may dispute my selection of data. However, I feel that these
numbers reflect accurately the more important trends. Of course, if
the reader does not like the assumptions here, he or she is free to
substitute their own figures. Most important, whether the results ex-
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pressed do or do not coincide with other studies, the cases described
here do highlight the key sources of "perturbation" to which U.S. SNF
sizing should be sensitive. And as U.S. str ategic policy requires, we
can also determine constantly, using calculations such as these, whether
serious imbalances between U. S. and Soviet capabilities are developing.
The basic instrument for SIOP planning is DE--Damage' Expec-
tency--computation. Simply, DE expresses the probability that a given
weapon will inflict a preplanned level of damage on a particular target.
The JCS in their instructions to JSTPS will express the national guid-
ance in terms of a set of criteria which is readily translated into DE.
DE is tnus the quantitative expression of the goals of U.S. nuclear
war plans.
DE combines two pieces of qualitative information on weapon's
performance: the overall mission performance of a weapon, and the
effect of the weapon on its designated target. Accordingly, for a cer-
tain "sortie" a strategic weapon has two ratings:
.A RELIABILITY rating, describing the probability that a wea-
pon will arrive "on target, " that is within some reasonable
miss distance, and explode. This is the product of the wea-
pon's prelaunch and flyout survivability, the successful pene-
tration of inflight defenses and the defeat of other enemy
countermeasures, and the reliability of all components and
subsystems required for proper weapons performance from
launch to fuzing.
.A LETHALITY rating, describing the effects of a successful
detonation against relevant targets of interest. Many lethal-
ity indices and formulae exist which describe, to varying
levels of sophistication and detail, the effects of a warhead
with given accuracy (CEP), yield, and height-of-burst on a
target with parametrized vulnerabilities. Against a silo




The notion of lethality is not necessarily synonomous with Pk as it is
usually defined, because we are not always interested in killing a tar-
get in the sense of destroying it utterly. To be sure, against silos and
similar targets, we probably will want to do severe damage, and so we
will attempt to ensure the achievement of a counter-silo DE of close to
unity. Against residential buildings and light industry, on the other
hand, we may deem it sufficient to cause less than obliteration. In
public discussion, however, problems of DEs much less than unity is
resolved by recourse to certain canonical aggregative criteria such as
"cookie cutters. "11
Using SOF ratings and target data, we can "build DEs" against
targets and develop some war plans. Consider the problem of attack-
ing a set of valuable but isolated point targets such as silos. We first
compare the OPK of appropriate weapons with the highest DE assign-
ed to any silo; say they are 0. 72 and 0. 90 respectively. After com-
mitting this weapon to this target, we would still require (0. 90-0. 72) =
0. 18 on that target to satisfy the DE of 0. 90. We then proceed down
the target list to the next target, which, say, has a DE of 0. 88. Us-
ing another weapon of the sort used on the first target, we have a DE
debt of 0. 16. We move down the list attacking subsequent targets;
ultimately we will reach 0. 18 and we could then plan to take a second
shot against the first target. Using a weapon with a DE of 0. 18 or
We use this formula instead of the more popular formula based on CMP,
because it seems that the numbers which it yields are rather closer to
the PVN calculations based on more detailed (but classifieca information
for the types of targets discussed here.
better satisfies the DE prerequisite. If there is no such weapon avail-
able, we may either have to use more than one extra shot on the tar-
get, or else we might go on to other targets.
On most targets, we can blend DEs. Suppose we have a silo
(DE=0. 9) and an nearby reload bunker (DE=0. 6). A weapon with 0. 72
OPK on the silo reduces its remaining DE to 0. 18, but say it has no
effect on the bunker. It may then be possible to find an aimpoint be-
tween the silo and bunker which satisfies the remaining DEs for both
(0. 18 and 0. 60 respectively). Such set of adjacent targets is called a
"target island. " If we are planning strikes on cities, it is clear that
computing aimpoints will be a complicated job, since we must satisfy
DEs on many nearby targets in an area while economizing on weapons
against the island. 12
Targets all belong to specific categories, such as "Strategic
Rocket Forces, " "Tactical Aviation, " and so on. Prior to the com-
mencement of SIOP preparation, each category is prioritized with
respect to all others. A minimum DE, corresponding in effect to
the relative importance of each category is determined. Thus, when
attacks on target set #1 have gone below a residual DE of 0. 25, the
target selection algorithm jumps to target category #2. There are
other rules and procedures, of course. There may be limits on the
numbers of weapons that can be spent on a particular target to pre-
vent the squandering of ineffective RVs on relatively invulnerable
targets or to take into account fratricide. Various attributes of wea-
pons and operations- -promptness of SNDVs, requirements for sup-
pression of defenses to ensure reliable penetration, ontime coordina-
tion, etc. -- obviously must figure also into plans.
A review of the components of reliability and lethality imme-
diately suggests some types of changes in the strategic planning en-
vironment on which force structure and employment plans are ideally
based. By comparing DEs and weapons capabilities over time, we
have a longitudinal measure of U.S. force effectiveness against select-
ed targets. Over time, as the number of targets increases, and reli-
ability of weapons drops, or as required DEs are increased by U.S.
policy decisions, U.S. planning must respond. Suppose that, all
things being equal, Soviet silos become harder. Say the SSPK of the
best available U.S. RV against a Soviet silo of x psi is 0. 45, and that we
require a DE on tnat silo of 0. 90. The silo hardness is uprated to y
psi, so that our SSPK for that type of RV falls to 0. 3. Then, a third
warhead of the same type is required. Likewise, suppose that a single
weapon is currently aimed midway between two Soviet research instal-
lations, satisfying a DE on each of 0. 47. But suppose that, because
of an upward reassessment of the importance of each target, (or, be-
cause it is discovered that the targets have been sandbagged) the DE is
increased (or the SSPK of the warhead falls). The two installations
now each rate their own weapon or alternatively, a larger weapon might
be programmed to the same aimpoint.
A list of major factors to which SIOP is sensitive appears in
Table 22.
Let's now turn to an evaluation of the effectiveness of U.S.
SNFs versus an evolving target base. In this analysis our operation-
al repertoire consist of these required missions:
. Countersilo (CS)
.Other Counterforce Targets (OCF)
.NATO Nuclear Employment Targets (NOP)
. Counter-Other Military Targets (COMT)
.Secure Strategic Reserve (S/R)
. Defense Suppression (D/S)
TABLE TWENTY-TWO
REALISTIC SOURCES OF IMPORTANT PERTURBATIONS FACING OPERATIONAL PLANNING
ADVERSE:
o Increase in number of targets, especially appearance of new
types of targets
o Increase in importance of targets relative to some constant target
prioritization scheme (for, say, use in preparation of imbalancing
attacks)
o Decrease in vulnerability of targets (e.g. by means of hardening)
o Decrease in reliability of friendly warheads
POSITIVE:
o Improved Lethality of weapons (e.g. greater Y, improved CEP)
o Improved reliatility and availability of warheads (e.g. silo upgrade,
greater on-sta ion rates for SSBNs, faster take-off and EMP hardening
for bombers)
o More warheads *by MIRVing, e.g. or by introduction of theater
weapons in lieu of central systems)
o Downgraded importance of some targets and missions (e.g. heavier
reliance on ALCMs would free up some warheads currently assigned
to suppress defenses in support of manned bomber attacks)
. Low Collateral Damage-Industrial/E conomic/ Tr ansporta-
tion (LCD-I/E/T)
,Urban/Industrial "Assured Destruction" targets. (U/I)
COUNTERSILO (CS)
As was demonstrated in Section III-1 above, the counterforce
mission has been a central determinant of employment planning since
the 1950s. Of all Soviet target systems, the Soviet Strategic Rocket
Forces (RVSN) target array has evolved so as to require constant quali-
tative and quantitative response. Quantitatively, the target list has ex-
panded from tens of aimpoints by 1960 to something like 1600 targets
today. In qualitative terms, most of tnese targets have been (or are
being) hardened to the extent that excellent offensive performance is
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now a prerequisite for even modest OPKs. As I will show, the RVSN
target base can be a major driver of U.S. SOF employment if the NCA
opts for a severe DE for these targets.
The U.S. 's ability to attack silos has in particular been driven
by changes on the part of both offense and targets. As Figure 23 indi-
cates, U.S. prompt ICBM CS performance has increased while the So-
viet target system has become more challenging from the point of view
of U.S. planners. Each factor has a corresponding positive or adverse
effect on U.S. requirements for covering silos with adequate DEs. The
problem remains to compute the relative weight of each on U.S. coun-
tersilo performance over time.
The cumulative impact of tnese trends is shown in Figure 24.
In the top line, the growth of ECMP 1 of U.S. forces with respect to a
fixed Soviet target set is shown. Thus, if U.S. forces for the years
described were to attack the Soviet silo target base as it existed in
1967, their ability to destroy these targets in those years would in-
crease dramatically as a result of the U.S. improvements dramatized
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in Figure 3. 1.A. Note that there is no prelaunch attrition of U.S.
ICBMs, and no operational reliability is taken into account. This
line describes the improvement of U.S. prompt CS capability over
time in the absence of any countervailing developments.
The other lines portray the impact of Soviet developments on
U.S. counter-silo capability. In the second line, current U.S. forces
are pitted against current Soviet targets. Again, we assume no pre-
launch vulnerability and missile reliability in each case is 1. 0. Thus,
were a completely available and reliable U.S. force to be launched in
a first strike against more and harder Soviet targets they would deli-
ver on an average basis the ECMP 'shown against silos. By compari-
son, the ECMP required to generate DEs of .9 and . 75 on the average
then-year silo is shown. Only in the baseline year 1967 can U. S.
ICBMs satisfy a .75 DE on Soviet ICBM targets. A U.S. first strike
would today generate a DE on the average silo of 0. 5. The third
and fourth lines reveal the degradation in U.S. capabilities resulting
from the introduction of reliability/availability factors. The third
line includes only a machine reliability of 0. 8; the fourth line adds a
prelaunch survivability degradation which moves from . 75 to .24
over the 1967-1983 period. It is clear that the ability of U.S. ICBM
forces to cover a canonical Soviet silo system with desirable DEs has
been more than undermined by Soviet initiatives.
The reason for the ICBM DE shortage on Soviet targets is
highlighted in Figure 25. For high DEs and relatively low OPKs, re-
quirements for on-target RVs quickly diverge beyond feasible levels.
*
cumulative second strike reliability: 1967=. 75; 1971=. 65; 1975=. 55;
1979=. 40; 1983=.24
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For example, if a DE of 0. 9 is selected, then if OPKs from 0. 7 to
0.9 are halved, the number of RVs required for that DE more than
doubles. As a case in point, to cover the Soviet silo base in 1979
with . 9 and .75 DE respectively would require 9048 and 6032 MMIII/
NS-20/Mk-12A, using generous assumptions on prelaunch ICBM sur-
vivability.
Since, under ideal conditions there is only about 1 U. S. RVI
silo, and since none of these RVs can produce a DE anywhere near
0. 75-0. 9, we have to look elsewhere to build DE.
Following the exhaustion of ICBM RVs against silos, any out-
standing DE debts can be "paid off" by allocation of bomber weapons
and SLBM RVs to remaining targets. Endorsement of either commit-
ment rarely appears in public discussion. It is held that these are un-
warranted attacks because (i) bomber weapons are not on target with
sufficient speed to find anything except empty holes, " and (ii) our
SLBM RVs are neither accurate nor explosive enough to contribute
more than a trivial gain to hard-target DEs. In practise, substan-
tial numbers of gravity bombs, ASMs, SLBM RVs, and, in the future,
cruise missiles, may be launched against silos, for several reasons.
First, subsequent shots might be feasible for "technical" rea-
sons. A moderately successful counter-ICBM laydown may damage
many enemy rounds in addition to killing others outright. A one-MT
burst: 1000-1200 meters from a 3000 psi silo will not destroy the silo
but the missile in it will be subjected to a force of several thousand
g's and, even if it is not destroyed, may not be operable for some
time.15 [38:71] Similarly, the same C3 safety features which pre-
vent unauthorized launch of ICBMs could produce launch delays under
attack. One source notes that only two MM LCFs can launch a flight
of missiles, but that launch time is extended to "several hours".
FIGURE TWENTY-FIVE
NUMBER OF U.S. REENTRY VEHICLES REQUIRED TO






















Page has been ommitted due to a pagination error
by the author.
(It takes a go vote all 10 flight LCFs, plus a vote from an LCF in
another flight to-launch MM immediately. [22:386]) Deliberate at-
tacks on LCFs might have such a delaying effect. Buried ICBM
field cabling and rf communications may be vulnerable to EMP and
other nuclear effects and could lead to slower response. An advan-
tage of "cold-launched" ICBMs (the SS-17 and 18 being fourth genera-
tion examples) is the fact that a silo can be "reloaded" with another
missile. Even if a hardened reload bunker is exactly next to the silo,
however, the process takes about twelve hours. Thus a bomber wea-
pons on a silo can prevent the use of launch facilities for refiring
ICBMs. 16 And, until about 1980 when the last SS-7 is decommis-
sioned, a number of Soviet ICBMs will remain vulnerable to SLBM
attack, since these older weapons are very soft and because some of
the weapons are in effect "crew served." Finally, some ICBMs may
not be ready to launch, either because of overhaul or for other rea-
sons. 17 The reader can probably imagine some other circumstances
under which bomber or submarine shots might add materially to OPKs
against Hard Targets.
Second, for completeness ot argument we must ask whether an
enemy would launch all of his surviving forces as opposed to losing
them to hostile action. Probably it is imprudent to wager on this, but
a first salvo by ICBMs is a sufficiently serious act of war that com-
manders on the receiving end probably would react in a consistent
way whether or not surviving defenses if any detected an incoming
wave of bombers. Further, even if an enemy did anticipate the un-
leashing of his surviving forces on warning of bomber attack, disrup-
tion ot C3 and the selective "breaking up" by ICBMs of an enemy's
in-place force could lead to serious holes in the residual ICBM
forces target coverage and thus a very inefficient launch-under-
bomber warning attack.
Third, and eclipsing these other reasons in practical conse-
quence is the simple fact that bomber weapons or Poseidon Mk-3 wea-
pons may be spent on silos, because targeting rules require it. To
the general public, the launch of a Mk-12 and 3 Poseidon RVs against
a 2000 psi silo may be squandering or throwing away the latter war-
heads, but to targeteers, this may be necessary to build an adequate
DE.
Some sample hybrid silo packages of two hardnesses are
shown in Figure 26.
In short, we are losing quickly our ability to cover CF tar-
gets to even modest DEs. By the mid-late 1980s, the OPKs of MMIII
RVs will be, including reliability, indistinguishable from those of cur-
rent (i. e. POSEIDON) submarine-based RVs for the hard target role.
This being the case, we must select on( or more of the following
courses of action:
.we can do nothing and suffer the increasing inefficiencies
in CF attacks,
.we can get out of the silo-busting business altogether,
. we can move to LOW which will still not generate good DEs
against an increasingly hard CS target base,
.we can eliminate part or all of the requirement for prompt
HTK and go to ALCMs as a delayed counterforce weapon,
.we can procure a new system (either M-X or Trident II or
both) to reverse ICBM reliability and inadequate SLBM le-
thality.
OTHER COUNTERFORCE (OCF)
The following targets are related counterforce objectives:
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/*/ NOTATION: each entry describes net DE built on target
after shots indicated. Entry is in format a/b where
a is the DE accomplished without reliability
or prelaunch survivability considerations
b is the DE when these degradations are
introduced
.500 IR/MRBMs
. 10 Operational ICBM test sites (Plesetsk, Star City, Kapus-
tin Yar, Baikonur Cosmodrome at Tyuratam)
.150 LCFs (based on U.S. ratio of LCFs: launchers)
. 50 Miscellaneous targets (reload bunkers, nuclear weapons
depots, etc.)
. 50 LRA bases (primary and staging)
. 5 SSBN ports
I allot one warhead of any type available to each target.
COMT
I assume that substantial numbers of strategic weapons are
assigned to some of the Soviet theater military objectives not cover-
ed by NOP. The COMT package is in effect a central strategic capa-
bility for theaters other than NATO. A hypothetical target system is
. 60 Western Military District Divisions
. 30 Central U. S. S. R. Divisions
.45 Far East Divisions
. 10 Fleet bases
.50 Frontal Aviation Main Operating Bases.
I allow one warhead of any type available for each target.
NOP (NUCLEAR OPERATIONAL PLAN)
NATO theater nuclear planning has been integrated with U.S.
central strategic planning since the early 1950s, when ROMEO tar-
gets would be attacked by both strategic systems and by newly em-
placed tactical nuclear forces (TNFs). TNFs were defined conceptu-
ally by Project VISTA at CalTech in 1948. TNW received a major
boost in 1949 when Chairman of the JCS General Bradley endorsed
the idea of using TNW as a counterweight to Soviet conventional su-
periority. In October, 1953, President Eisenhower authorized the
JCS to include tactical and strategic nuclear weapons in NATO defense
plans. [45: Chap 3]
Between 1953 and about 1973, NATO nuclear employment
plans were necessarily linked to a full SIOP execution. According to
MC 14/2, in force during the 1950s, a Warsaw Pact breach of the
NATO tripwire would uncleash a massive theater nuclear retaliatory
blow. The NATO GSP (General Strike Program) would be executed
as part of an ensuing massive central strike. The great importance
of the GSP to U.S. defense planners can be gauged by the great priority
invested in nuclear-oriented tactical strike aircraft both land and car-
rier based.
NATO's conversion to the MC 14/3 "flexible response" doc-
trine in the late-1960s apparently did not change TN planning. It is
said that NATO then "had a choice of options linked to the SIOP or
nothing, " (except for a few weapon demonstration package) [15:20],
and that as a result, NOP attacks remained massive.
In 1973, Secretary Schlesinger attempted to shift U.S. /NATO
TNW policy to an emphasis on graduated response options. Among
other things, this included tne development of the appropriate C3 ap-
paratus to permit control over nuclear forces after the first exchange
[15:21]. Schlesinger also recommended the deployment of GLCM
as a useful took for rationalizing TNF structure (by reducing vul-
nerability of QRA a/c and improving performance of NATO TNFs)
[42] as well as approving production of the "ERW. " [48:46]
Most important, Schlesinger ordered development of new
theater nuclear war plans other than the GSP. According to Schlesin-
ger, theater LNOs developed ranged from packages of 3-5 weapons
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on up the scale to massive salvoes involving thousands of weapons.
As well, in 1974-, Schlesinger said that all U.S. central strategic
forces would be given a theater nuclear capability.
Currently, the NOP has three generic components. The PSP
[Priority Strike Plan] are attack plans using loaded and "cocked"
QRA forces. PSP targets are those of primary interest to SACEUR;
it seems that the PSP is an analogue of the Counterforce portions of
the U.S. SIOP. TSPs [Tactical Strike Programs] are large packages
which can consist of attacks on targets which arise during theater con-
tingencies as well as attacks on preplanned targets. There are also
SEPs [Selective Employment Plans] which are theater LNOs.
All in all, there would probably be 750-850 long-range tar-
gets in a full NOP. Of these from 200-500 would probably be struck
by execution of a PSP. The creation of SEPs has greatly refined
NATO's TN posture, by allowing meaningful theater nuclear response
at a less than massive level.
However, the NOP remains locked to the SIOP. If the full
SIOP is ordered, residual NOP forces will be fired in their entirety
against targets not previously destroyed by SEPs or by a TSP.
SACEUR prepares plans and nominates a NOP target list to JSTPS,
who advise SACEUR of any redundancy between NOP coverage and
other planned coverage. Within this framework, SACEUR is free to
use his warheads as he deems most appropriate.
The NOP commands:
all U.S. TNFs in Europe, especially QRA aircraft, 18 and
including at least the two CV task forces commited to the
Mediterranean
.the 4 U.K. POLARIS-armed SSBNs [6:26]
. Five U.S. POSEIDON SSBNs. 19
Of these only tne Poseidons represent an a priori commitment of
U.S. strategic systems and would count against U.S. SNF SNDV
and RV levels. Because they are targeted in coordination with SIOP,
they are counted against net U. S. capabilities and are assumed not
to assist in the completion of central strategic objectives.
DEFENSE SUPPRESSION (D/S)
As I suggested in Chapter II, Defense Suppression for bombers
is a crucial and increasingly complex problem. Proponents of vari-
ous bomber systems have always argued that bombers are more "flexi-
ble" than ballistic systems. This is most likely not congruent with
the practical view held of aircraft at JSTPS. Bomber trajectories
must be rigidly controlled and mission milestones carefully timed to
ensure coordination of bomber times-on-targets or HCL trespass,
with other sorties (especially suppression, but also to prevent "fra-
tricide of bombers" caused by friendly attack.) For crew and aircraft
safety and to ensure maximum SIOP effectiveness, precise release,
yield select, fuxing, attack/egress/recovery and other procedures
must be followed exactly. (And for political reasons, you do not
want armed aircraft flying "armed recce", i. e. looking around for
nuclear targets of opportunity). From a targeteers perspective, a
bomber is but a "manned missile. " 21
Suppression of enemy air defenses will therefore remain an
important strategic mission so long as manned bomber forces are a
major part pf the TRIAD. Because the destruction of a single man-
ned bomber could result in a failure to cover several targets, then
HCL = H-hour line of control, the point at which bombers are ac-
quired by Soviet air defenses.
increasing the reliability of surviving, launched gravity bombs and
ASMs is desirable for the sake of "smooth" SIOP execution. Sup-
pression for ALCMs is much less important, as attrition can to a
large degree be compensated for simply by sending more rounds.
As W. Perry has frequently noted, USAF's proposed cruise missile
operational "tactic" is to overwhelm Soviet defenses by strength of
numbers.22 An attractive feature of a switch to a homogeneous ALCM/
standoff bomber force is that much of the D/S requirement would pre-
sumably disappear and some warheads would become available for
other missions.
PVO Strany is large and has become appreciably more compe-
tent over time. As U.S. bomber penetration probability are said to
have remained a constant .85 for many years, it follows either that
many warheads are used to soften up a wide range of Soviet air de-
fenses or else that SAC concentrates or opening up very thoroughly
a few penetration corridors using fewer weapons. In times of war-
head deficit, the latter probably describes JSTPS practise: this tac-
tic is also consonant with the theoretical advantage accorded any pre-
23ferential offense.
In order to destroy interceptor or mobile SAM/surveillance
forces before they can be "flushed" from airbases or garrison, it is
useful to attack them promptly, that is, to use IC/SLBMs against
relevant targets. (But even if this advantage is not gained, destruc-
tion of bases, O&M, relief ..rews, and POL can complicate substan-
Y1aily the Soviet's ability to recycle its units and may restrict some
of PVO to a single air defense sortie.) It is reported that a program
to harden PVO hangarettes is being undertaken to foil such suppres-
sion opportunities [54:42]. Assuming that aircraft can fly out of and
be recovered within a radiation/EMP environment, the goal then be-
comes cratering or cracking runways, a mission for which POSEI-
DONs are probably inadequate; yet because MINUTEMAN RVs will
be scarce, I assign C-3 RVs to this role. (Attacks on GCI, the linch-
pin of PVO will continue to be effective.)24
It is impossible to say just how many warheads might be launch-
ed in D/S strikes. Aspin assumes that about 400-500 surviving SRAMs
(after a Soviet attack on a day-to-day U.S. force) are used for D/S
[16:10]. Quanbeck and Wood suggest that from 200 to 400 warheads
are adequate to open up penetration corridors. [25:67] I will use 320
in this analysis, of which half are SRAM and half Poseidon.
As Soviet continental defenses become more mobile and capable,
it may happen that PVO Strany will acquire the ability to reconstitute
severely damaged defenses in bomber penetration corridors within a
relatively short time. If the possibility exists of penetration corri-
dors becoming quickly clogged, then D/ : would probably be linked
only to relatively large bomber raids, as it would not then be worth-
while to destroy many defenses for the sake of permitting a few air-
craft to penetrate. Under these circumstances, D/S attacks would
be used in attacks ranging from regional LNOs to full-scale SIOP
attacks.
SECURE RESERVE (S/R)
Even in the most savage arsenal exchange models, a last-
strike secure reserve force is withheld. The purpose of the S/R is
generally given as the maintenance of something bordering on "essen-
tial equivalence" even after an all-out U/I attack. More recently,
No weapons are dedicated to the Moscow ABM system.
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a S/R force has been described as valuable by virtue of its ability
to coerce recovery contributions from non-devastated nations after
aU.S./U.S.S.R. general war. [30]
"Secure Reserve forces are mainly a byproduct of the
1961 McNamara SIOP reforms. In accordance with the
new graduated response doctrine, and its emphasis on
"intrawar deterrence" a reserve was to be held. As
McNamara noted at Ann Arbor, our conduct of strate-
gic operations would be done "while retaining reserve
forces, all centrally controlled. " [1]
This clearly was part of the basis of the important decision to move
to solid propellant missiles and to armor ICBMs against attack.
Likewise, the POLARIS had the advantage of being witholdable.
How large would a S/R be? In the ACDA Soviet Civil Defense
study, the U.S. is said to withhold some 10-15/c of its warheads.
[13:6] The IIM Soviet Civil Defense analysis uses 20% [3]. A Boeing
Company rebuttal to the ACDA study tei med ACDA's S/R allocation
"too low. " [37] Thus, I assume that the U.S. withholds at least 15%
of its warheads. Some insiders have complained that the utility of
the S/R is minimized by the assignment of the least effective and
relevant U.S. weapons to that mission. On the basis of this evidence,
I assume here that all A-3, 592 C-3, and 480 gravity bomb weapons
constitute our Secure Reserve force.
ASSURED DESTRUCTION ATTACKS AND VARIANTS
The most conspicuous and least likely nuclear operational con-
tingency for which the United States prepares is the execution of an
all-out, "Assured Destruction" -style attack. Under this concept,
should worse come to worst, the U.S. must be able at any time to
commit a significant fraction of its forces against enemy Urban In-
dustrial (U/I) targets with the objective of satisfying the national
guidance's required for a full-SIOP level blow against Soviet Union.
In the mid-1960's McNamara often described publicly the mission of
such an attack as "the destruction of the Soviet Union as a viable
twentieth century nation. " Subsequently, the guidance has apparently
evolved away from destroying viability and has tended to speak of de-
laying the recovery of the Soviet Union from the damage inflicted in
a U.S. SIOP-level attack.25 In fact, a PRM on the subject is now in
progress to consider a whole-scale revision of the U.S. 's targeting
policies in this regard. [94] It has been implied that the switch in
targeting results from a recognition that the destruction of Soviet via-
bility might not be a feasible task, although in practise the actual
outcomes of different attacks (some designed to destroy viability and
some to impede recovery) probably do not vary by more than a few
percent in terms of their effects (measured by fraction of target type
destroyed, ability to convert/use surviving resources, etc.).
In the early 1960s, OSD/SA formally devised the "assured de-
struction" principle. [100] [101] Estimates of U.S. forces surviving
Soviet attack under a variety of scenarios were made, and these wea-
pons were allocated to Soviet U/I targets in the following manner.
First, an arbitrary damage rule, such as the "cookie cutter" was
set. Then weapons were overlayed on maps of Soviet urban areas
so that most of the productive economic assets in a city would reside
inside a cookie cutter radius. Proceeding from the largest city
on down the list (until warheads are all accounted for) U/I damage
is computed by summing tne fraction of IFS26 within all cookie cut-
ter's. In this way, SA discovered that U.S. SOF's would be able to
destroy an impressive fraction of Soviet IFS (about 50-70%), and
would kill 20-25% of the Soviet population (which is colocated with
industry).27 (The damage levels were computed by attacking reliably
the largest 200 Soviet cities, and using the generally accepted index
index of normalized blast effect, EMT.) In strategic rhetoric, it is
argued that this -damage is unacceptable to the Soviet leadership, but
it is unlikely if anyone knows this for sure. Rather, Assured Destruc-
tion merely describes U.S. force capabilities as they stood at the
time the A. D. computations were made, i. e. in 1964.
According to the 400 EMT rule, the aggregate U.S.S.R. U/I
target base has not changed appreciably over time. Claims of indus-
trial and population dispersal to the contrary, Soviet countervalue as-
sets have in fact become more concentrated over the last decade. Be-
cause only about 2% of the Soviet population own private cars (and for
some other reasons), the result of'increasing concentration is great-
er urban density with relatively little outward creep of cities into
suburban belts, as has been the U. S. experience. 28 Thus the data
presented in Figure 27 below are indicative of a somewhat more"lucra-
tive" target system; the Soviets have unwittingly made a contribution
towards more efficient U.S. Assured Destruction targeting.
FIGURE 27
INCREASING CONCENTRATION OF SOVIET URBAN/INDUSTRIAL BASE
Population Industrial Production
# Cities 1966 1975 1966 1975
10 8.0 8.7 18.4 17.1
50 17.2 19.6 40.0 38.4
100 22.5 26.0 52.4 51.9
200 28.1 32.9 64.5 65.3
300 31.4 36.6 70.9 72.5
Source [80:70]
Even had the Soviets succeeded in making the effort to proli-
ferate economic, administrative and other assets to remote areas,
the overall cost to the U. S. of placing reliable extra warheads on
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fnew~targets is so trivial relative to the cost of the new installations
that such a Soviet tactic can be dismissed as a likely source of per-
turbation to U.S. strategic operational plans. At any rate, all evi-
dence indicates that Soviet interest in economies of scale has pre-
vailed over dispersion as a tenet of Central plan siting. 29
Yet qualitatively and from the perspective of target planning
staffs, the Soviet U/I target system has changed in such a way that
U.S. offensive planning must make great compensation. More im-
portant, recent and "'new" U.S. targeting practises (those currently
being debated and likely to appear in a new SIOP revision) may re-
quire some radical changes in operational planning. The net impact
on U. S. SOFs will probably be a pressure to many more warheads
with superior performance. As things now stand, new forces will be
required for these missions, since currently deployed weapons are
increasingly unsatisfactory for U/I sort -es, at least as the trends are
moving.
These changes are due to initiatives to increase the "articula-
tion" in U.S. U /I war planning rules. As data bases have improved,
and as economic damage and recovery models have been refined and
some analysts have proposed tne attribution of specific DEs to many
of the components of the Soviet economy. Some target selection al-
gorithms will now seek to set very high OPKs against certain instal-
lations in a city and will not use cookie cutters and IFS/MVA in plan-
ning laydowns (except to computer collateral damage).
Because under many circumstances, individual targets cannot
be linked, a given target island will constitute more aimpoints than
before if equal (or greater) damage levels are to be achieved on se-
parated installations in the island. Against segregated point targets
(some of which may be hardened), small POSEIDON-type warheads
encounter substantial problems. Suppose a target of importance is
hard by coincidence or design, or, more likely, that it is determined
that the equipment in the plant will require a high psi P-effect. 30 To
produce, say, 200 psi over the plant, though, requires resetting HOB
(from that which would be chosen to maximize psi over an area) with
the result that the area covered by a 10 psi or better blast drops by
about 50%. In this example, fuzing reliability and CEP are much
more important than they would be with the 10 psi coverage maxi-
mization case because of the small window above a target within
which a weapon must be exploded to take advantage of overpressure
reflection.
Another result contributing to a requirement for a greater
number of warheads is the impact of offset aiming on OPKs for tar-
gets near aimpoints. Consider Table 28:
FIGURE 2,
Pk OF A POSEIDON WARHEAD FOR OFFSET AIMING
OFFSET
target hardness 1000 feet 2000 feet 4000 feet
10 psi .96 .93 .66
25 psi .59 .48 .14
50 psi .31 .23 .05
[OPT HOB; CEP = 2000 Ft]
When low HOBs are chosen to maximize high local blast, the situa-
tion is even worse. It is easy to imagine, after reviewing these
data and others, a requirement to assign a nonintuitively large num-
ber of RVs to a given cluster of high value targets.
The requirements for increasingly precise and thorough U/I
targeting mainly derive from changing assessments of the damage
required to accomplish the goals stated in the guidance for a full-
SIOP attack. The empirical data produced by USSBS and the theore-
tical analyses of viability and recovery times done with such tools
as Input/Output modeling31 support the notion that a successful at-
tack relies on the complete destruction of specified economic, ad-
ministrative, and related sectors with resultant "imbalancing" of
social activities and failure to reestablish viability.
Yet the question of what activities are essential and which re-
quire reliable attack is not easy to solve. J. Leavitt produced a long
list of industrial activities which were considered essential in 12 ma-
jor studies of U.S. recovery [12]. This list can surely be expanded.
Moreover, auxiliary activities such as transportation and management
are not integrable into the I/O models. Finally, targeting schemes
designed to exploit Soviet national cultural differences, to destroy lo-
cal Soviet party, administration and international security apparati,
or to exploit other weaknesses are difficult to translate into practical
targeting rules. Given planning conservatism (especially redundant
coverage for vital targets), it is clear that an apparent "diminution"
in target coverage could arise. Thus, between the FY66 and FY69
Annual Reports, McNamara's criteria for assured destruction drop-
ped:
FIGURE 29
PERCENT OF EACH TYPE OF TARGET DESTROYED
REQUIRED FOR ASSURED DESTRUCTION





Eventually, the objective of destroying viability was apparently drop-
ped as a SIOP mission description in favor of the objective of "de-
laying recovery for the longest time possible. "32 Maximally delay-
ed recovery is, in analytic terms, less demand than the destruction
of viability. The move from one to the other almost certainly repre-
sents a conclusion by planners that it was impossible to destroy So-
viet viability either because the appropriate Soviet target base was
too large to be adequately struck or, conversely, because the neces-
sary RVs for this mission had (i) been programmed out of the A/D
package into other missions, or (ii) become somehow less effective
against a portion of the necessary targets.
At the same time, a decision was made to deploy the Mk-3 RV
rather than either the Mk-12 or Mk-17 (or a mix) aboard the Posei-
don missile [8:71]. Although the choice of the Mk-3 POSEIDON has
often been attributed to the bureaucratic interest of SPO [8:99], it
may be the case that the (average of) 10 RV configuration represents
a perceived A/D warhead shortfall for the full-SIOP mission, with a
corresponding requirement for more broad target coverage. The
counter-recovery pressures on our ability to do a full A/D attack
since then have continued.
The greatest of these strains has been the Soviet Civil Defense
Program. Debate on SUCD tends to ignore the crucial fact that Sovi-
et recovery is apparently dependent first and foremost on the survival
of political, military, and economic managers and that a U.S. attack
should seek to amputate the "head" rather than the "limbs" of the
Soviet Union. Because of the construction of shelters (together
with tighter requirements on DEs for key installations), the Soviet
economic/administrative target base might resemble increasingly
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As even stronger requirement for A./D warheads emerge, the techni-
cal requirements for U/I weapons may be assymptotic to those of
top-of-the-line HTK-oriented RVs. Cruise missiles are an apparent-
ly ideal answer to this dilemma.
Putting aside these various points, we will use in this analysis
the historical requirement for a reliable 400 EMT attack on 200 cities.
We will also require some weapons for attack of targets located out-
side the Soviet urban/industrial target base (other than this 400 EMT).
But I note in passing that while a strong warhead requirement such as
is apparently developing does not by itself mitigate appreciably the
awesome damage done in any nucle'ar war, the fact does remain that
a seeming shortfall of warheads may lead either to changes in the na-
tional guidance or requirements for new forces the re'sults of which
may not be optimal from an American point-of-view.
LOW COLLATERAL DAMAGE INDUSTRIAL/ECONOMIC /TRANS-
PORTATION (LCD-I/E/T)
A substantial number of targets such as:
.power generation
.gas and oil extraction, and mining
.transportation bottlenecks--bridges, rail, locks and
canal system interdiction nodes
.agricultural production and storage
.industry located away from urban areas (such as Aluminum--
and tierefore aerospace- -which uses large amounts of power
generated by hydroelectric power facilities)
will be attacked in addition to the U/I target base discussed above.
No public data describes well the size of such a target system.
Therefore, using the U.S. economy as an analogue, I will require
the delivery of 550 weapons on these Soviet targets (since about 20%
of the U.S. MVA is located outside of urban areas, a proportional
force for these targets is (400 EMT/80%/20% t100 EMT.) As EMT
is an irrelevant index, since we are interested in coverage of the
most points and not geographic area, I allocate 400 POSEIDON RVs
and 150 SRAMs to these targets.
U.S. FORCE LOADINGS: SURFEIT OR AUSTERITY?
In order to gauge the sufficiency of U.S. SOFs to cover their
appointed targets, I will simulate two nuclear wars. In OPTION ONE,
U.S. commanders withhold the forces necessary to execute full and
undergraded U/I and LCD-I/E/T attacks. In OPTION TWO, the U.S.
begins its campaign with a two-on-one attack on Soviet CS targets.
As Figure thirty-one shows, there is little room to maneuver
in either case. After alloting RVs for obligated target systems (NOP,
D/s, S/R, COMT), we see that
.OPTION ONE permits only abo; t 1 shot on the average
against CS targets
.OPTION TWO "overdraws weapons" and we would be ob-
liged to dip into S/R to satisfy a 400 EMT attack.
Note that these numbers do not include enemy action, and do not re-
flect the effectiveness of forces.
One fact is clear. It is evident that the U.S. is unable to
generate the forces required to attack adequately part or all of tne
Soviet Hard Target base. Even if more weapons were available,
however, U.S. OPKs vs. Hard Targets are fast approaching unac-
ceptable levels. The same trend may one day also trouble U/I at-
tack plans. In order to analyze U/I effectiveness, though, we in-
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creasingly will be required to resort to more sophisticated analysis
than the "cookie -cutter" and P/1-95 rules used heretofore in the offi-
cial planning community and still active in public studies. Sinc.e this
is not a feasible task, we'll focus in Chapter IV on the implications of
the force sizing and employment planning trends discussed supra, by
using the Soviet Hard Military Target system as a case-in-point.
CHAPTER IV: CONCLUDING REMARKS
In Chapters II and III I have described some trends in force
structure and employment planning for the strategic nuclear forces.
My results are summarized here.
STRATEGIC FORCE STRUCTURE PLANNING
.U.S. strategic nuclear forces as they are now are those
chosen by McNamara between 1961 and 1963; forces have been limit-
ed by assured destruction and other rules to prevent acquisition am-
bitious of the military services.
.Since 1966-68, even the "arbitrary" A.D. rule used by Mc-
Namara has been cast aside.
.In terms of SNDV levels, forces have been shaped since 1964
by aircraft attrition; in terms of RVs, forces have grown, but the
ability of forces to do certain missions has not changed one way or
the other.
.Of changes in the strategic target base, growth in number of
Soviet hard military targets has been the key trend.
.Of all changes instituted to deal with anevolving target base
and strategic context, most changes have been made "at the margin."
STRATEGIC EMPLOYMENT PLANNING
. Hard-targets drive SIOP preparation.
.War planning is done independent of force planning.
.Employment planning has stayed roughly the same over time,
and does not appear to be influenced by "external" (i. e. outside of
JSTPS) developments.
Clearly each type of planning has gone its own way. The
forces we would require to build adequate DEs on Soviet silos have
102
been available for assignment by force planners. Conversely, em-
ployment planners probably will design "inefficient' attacks (putting
POSEIDONs on silos, e.g.) regardless of the evolving capabilities
of the force structure. Although this appears in a variety of frame-
works, let's view the most arresting example of this phenomenon,
namely the "hard-target kill" case.
There is no doubt that U.S. war plans place a heavy emphasis
on attacking Soviet silos. While an official associated with SIOP pre-
paration noted in 1977 that
"There is no plan for a disarming first strike; there is
no national policy requirement, nor do we field the
capability for such a strike, " [81:44]
this does not mean that silo attacks are not envisaged. In the FY77
Annual Report, Secretary Rumsfeld said,
"This degree of flexibility . . . necessarily includes
the option and the capability to . trike accurately at
military targets including some hardened sites. But
it does not permit, and our programs do not aim to
acquire, a disarming first strike capability against
the U.S.S.R." [77]
The reason for less than total coverage is probably the short-
age of appropriate warheads more than any other factor. There are
two reasons why this has been the case. First, the number of reliable
weapons suitable for counterforce constantly has been undermined
by Soviet activities. Second, the lethality of U.S. RVs has lost a
race with Soviet hardening.
In the case of reliability, improving Soviet CEPs increasingly
have threatened MINUTEMAN.
In response to this threat, the U.S. has deferred or cancelled
repair programs. The M-X, for instance, has been in engineering
development since 1973, and tnat system's progress will undoubtedly
languish as the result of major political debate (affiliated with SALT
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II) before a go-ahead decision is given. TRIDENT II has suffered an
identical history. More important than delays in developments has
been a requirement that M-X be available for prompt launch, which
inherently renders the system vulnerable to an attack of certain scale.
(M-X merely increases the number of weapons that the Soviets must
expend to decimate U.S. forces). Most M-X basing modes have been
described as warhead "sponges."
Unlike Soviet forces, U.S. SNFs are kept at a very high de-
gree of "readiness" [82:77] [83:14]. In fact, U.S. forces have been
designed expressly for this capability.
It was reported that MM could be launched in 35 seconds [63].
This more than size or storability considerations probably drove the
U.S. to solid fueled ICBMs. H. York reports that the original MM
rationale was LOW! [46:186] This is corroborated by the fact that
the earliest MM could be auto destructed. (It turned out that solid
fuels were also very suitable for armoring.)
But a collateral to prompt launch is vulnerability. Thus
"If we can eliminate the vulnerability of our strategic
arms to surprise attack, we will have broken the vi-
cious circle: that they must be ready for prompt
launch because they are vulnerable, and that they
are vulnerable because they must be ready. " [10:16]
Moreover, prompt launch enhances the risk of accident. Yet while
some thought has been given to a variety of inert (survivable but de-
layed) launched ICBMs no one involved in force or employment plan-
ning views the option seriously. All current options are techniques
to spread rather than alleviate U.S. force vulnerability. There is
not much hope for planning alternatives as opposed to extensions
ot the U.S. 's counterforce posutre.
Similarly, U.S. SNF lethality has not kept pace with the re-
quirements of the Hard-Target Mission. MINUTEMAN III has been
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upgraded, but President Carter has failed either to increase the num-
ber of MM III or to upgrade MM 11 (84]. The survivable SLBM forces
also have not been equipped to bear part or all of the prompt counter-
force mission. Between 1967 and 1973, for example, Congress acted
repeatedly to prevent the development of accurate POSEIDON. First
a proposed mix of POSEIDON's including Mk-12 and Mk-17 hard-
target killer RVs and the STINGS guidance (as well as the Mk-3)was
vetoed. A 1969 DoD initiative to repair some POSEIDON accuracy
problems was defeated by Congress; a 1970 DoD budget request was
cut by Congress "to prevent future hard-target kill capability, " and
budget requests for improved accuracy were likewise excised for
FY71 and FY72. [10] It is even possible that the yield of the POSEI-
DON RVs was intentionally downgraded during this time.
To support his counterforce requirements, then SecDef
Schlesinger appears to have chosen the reasonable course of con-
cealing HTK development programs. Command Data Buffer in par-
ticular is known only for its retargeting capability, but CDB permits
an improvement in MM accuracy independent of its "retargeting"
capabilities.
In short, the legislative body responsible for approving force
structure decisions has consistently undercut JSTPS' counterforce
packages. On the other hand, JSTPS probably continues to use any
and all forces available for CF attacks. I am saying nothing here
in favor of or against CF. But it stands to reason that (no CF-
targeting- plus-no CF-forces) and (CF-targeting-plus-CF-forces)
are reasonable postures whereas "using POSEIDONs on silos"
really is the worst of all worlds.
It is not surprising then that Harold Brown has spoken with
concern of this breakdown in planning. In the FY79 Report, Brown
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noted that force structure and employment planning would no longer
be "decoupled, " and this theme was even more emphatically put in
the FY80 Report.
But it seems that the initiatives now underway are destined
to perpetuate the historical disconnect. The three leading "threats"
to reformed planning are SALT, Essential Equivalence, and ALCM.
Whether by coincidence or not these are also the three endeavors
which SecDef Brown most strongly supports.
Thus, SALT boxes in U.S. force options, and makes force
planning easier by relieving the U.S. of the requirement for diffi-
cult decisions. Essential Equivalence similarly defers the initiative
for force sizing to the U.S. S. R. The cruise missile is tte ideal
"immediately available option. " It can be deployed in arbitrarily
large quantities to cover a growing target base. Grimly, it is ideal
for NATO deployment. It is accurate e iough for all missions. Sa-
crificed only is prompt response.
Two purposes of planning are (i) the coordination of future events
and minimization of surprise and (ii) the manipulation of the future to
our advantage. The future of U.S. forces seems to be in disarray,
and there is evidence to suggest that we are not exploiting the second
use of planning.
As Donald Rurnsfeld said in his FY78 Report:
"If the life of fixed, hard ICBMs cannot be extended . . .
the U.S. should not accept a strategic relationship in
which we must bear the heavier costs of alternate
basing while the Soviets are allowed the luxury of re-
taining their fixed ICBMs. "
But, by failing to deploy a more lethal force earlier, this privilege
is in fact accorded the U.S.S.R.
"had the U.S. acted more positively with POSEIDON in 1969, would
the Soviets have deploged he same ICBM-heavy force which now
causes so many probl ms
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Moreover, by stretching out decisions, we may put expensive
systems on-line-past their period of greatest utility. C. Gray ob-
serves that, because of IOC slippage in M-X, that missile will not be
available during the period 1982-87 when it will be most needed, but
that, deployed in the late-1980's it may face unforseeable problems
with new types of ABM. [29]
Likewise if ASW were to advance 20 years overnight, we might
cancel our Ohio-class SSBN program in favor of boats with 6 to 10
tubes. In twenty years, of course, TRIDENT boats will be among
the mainstays of our SNFs, and it is possible that we might then have
an ASW gap. The fault will lie not 'in Soviet advance however but
with the decisions of the late 1970s.
I will conclude this thesis with a few "final comments."
FINAL COMMENTS
The constituents of our planning DYAD--force structure and
employment planners--may be likened to the technical assistants
who support senior decision-makers in large corporations. Force
structure planners manage inventory by projection depletion of U.S.
capabilities, by determining threshold criteria for inventory shortfall
and by introducing lead time considerations into replenishment sche-
dules. Employment planning is analogous to, say, air route schedul-
ing with its requirement for sequentially programmed activities,
coordination of aircraft with client "demand" and timing.
But in the corporate world, neither is able to resolve the ba-
sic decisions on which profit and other measures of success hinge.
In business, senior officials will merge the assessments of all sup-
porting staffs according to some set of criteria which collectively
we might call an "objective function. " The objective function pro-
vides a means for translating proposed strategies into payoffs to
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the firm. The payoff is not profit alone, nor sales, nor the elimina-
tion of competitors, since the best outcome for each player in such
a market economy tends to reside within (as opposed to being at the
edge of) a bounded set of feasible outcomes for all players [85]. To
the extent their abilities and experience permit, corporate comman-
ders can steer the "best" course through uncertain waters. Here,
success is more than the evasion of shipwreck--it is the achievement
of preset, well defined goals which are congruent with the broader
aims of the leaders and the organizations they represent.
This analogy describes well the strategic nuclear planning
environment. However, there is no objective function in planning
which we might use. Rather the sole criterion by which we gauge
our progress is the avoidance of war: as M. Dunham has noted, it
is a peculiar trait of American strategic thinking that we set up nu-
clear warfare as a mutual foe of the U.S. and U.S.S. R., as an
"imaginary player, " (in the terminology of n-person game theory),
against whom the two superpowers must collude [86] [87]. Implicit
in the assumption are two axioms. First, there is a general feeling
that nuclear war is not war in any useful sense: as Harold Brown
has said, nuclear weapons cannot capture territory, they can just
blow things up. In fact, nuclear weapons cause destruction so ef-
ficiently that limitation of damage for useful goals is not feasible.
Likewise, "superiority, " "advantage, " etc. have no meaning. As
E. Rabinowich wrote at the dawn of the atomic age that:
"if both sides in a conflict have enough atomic bombs
to wipe out the others' cities, they are in approximate-
ly equal position even if one has three times more
bombs than the other. " [88]
As a result, there are no criteria for the success of nuclear planning
save "no nuclear wars."
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Unfortunately this tends to obscure the fact that neither force
structure nor ernployment planning (nor both combined) are "substi-
tutes" for a priori policy determinations; each should be an important
aid in the implementation of policies which are tuned to support net
U.S. national security goals. I do not think it is too optimistic to
assume that if we decided just exactly what we wished to do with SNFs,
and if we could build a convincing set of operational "rules, " we could
build simultaneously forces and plans "downwards" from national se-
curity objectives. Under the circumstances, our strategic posture
would be useful in emergency, and most important it would be robust
in the face of external perturbations and uncertainty.
Consider for a moment the implications of Mr. Paul Warnke's
testimony to Senator Proxmire's committee that a failure of SALT
would necessitate a $30-40 Billion U. S. crash spending program. It
is hard to think of a more serious indictment of our planning that Mr.
Warnke has served here. Mr. Warnke is stating that the U.S. must
be protected against some threats by SALT and not by its military
forces. To design forces to such an extent that a relatively small in-
ternational development can blast them off balance to the tune of $40
billion hardly seems a good sign.
Now, not even in Erewhon will our planning work out all the
time. It is debatable whether any posited national objective could or
should be integrated clearly with the possible use of nuclear weapons.
Indeed a major theme of declaratory U.S. policy is the ambiguity and
uncertainty of nuclear warfare (''Cosmic throw of the dice"). This
view is predicated strongly on what is the inappropriateness of nu-
clear weapons for nearly every contingency. More substantively,
the tenacious U.S. belief in the inevitable escalation of any type of
war to holocaust underscores what is close to being a religious belief
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in the unsuitability of nuclear forces for application to situations
where some military activity is a possibility [9]. Nuclear weapons
are a ttrick deck" we reserve for introduction when our luck starts
to fade in the big card game.
This kind of thinking is exemplified most clearly in the
Counterforce/LNO/Collateral Damage debate begun in about 1973
and continuing through this date. Thus a pivot of the case argued by
foes of counterforce is, to cite a widely read article,
"Strikes causing relatively few casualties would be
militarily insignificant; strike inflicting appreciable
damage on U.S. strategic forces would cause very
large civilian casualties. " [89:145]
"Military effectiveness" is defined here as the nearly total elimina-
tion of the U. S. ICBM force, and massive collateral damage (in the
case of the worst Soviet attack) could be in the neighborhood of 13
Million fatalities. But Bruce Bennett [. 7] has demonstrated that the
U.S.S.R. could clean up its attack by a variety of simple measures.
Under these circumstances, maximum collateral fatality levels fall
to about 3 million, with a two million median: these figures are about
an order of magnitude less than those caused by the basic silo-buster
baseline attack, and the "cost" to the Soviets to reduce U.S. fatalities
is the survival of an extra 4-10% of U. S. SNFs.
Even though Bennett's attack challenges the central contention
of counterforce critics (i. e. that a CF attack is not necessarily tan-
tamount--in fatalities--to an attack on several American cities), most
people ignore the possibility of a Soviet clean-up. Avoiding Whiteman
drives down collateral fatalities, but most people consider it irration-
al for the Soviet attack to attempt to do its worst against anything less
Avoiding Whiteman AFB, and 8 SAC bases, airbursting, and using
550KT instead of 3 MT shots on silos.
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than the entire U.S. central strategic target system! At one point
it was widely held (indeed many still cling to the notion) that a Soviet
sneak attack would lay waste to American cities as early as possible,
maybe even avoiding military targets in the process. Today, we
doubt the reasonableness of this scenario, while at the same time
we cannot bring ourselves to conceive of a Soviet attack which would
try to cut out the basis for a U.S. retaliatory attack on Soviet cities
which might be justified at the time. Then-SecDef Schlesinger was
denounced as he argued that "the likelihood of limited nuclear attacks
cannot be challenged on the assumption that massive civilian fatalities
and injuries would result." [31] Perhaps Soviet planners would not
be so quick to execrate Dr. Schlesinger's contention after viewing
the details of the clean attack.
Other evidence suggests that we do not view nuclear war as a
real problem. A non-provocative form of civil defense might include
stricter regulations to prevent the siting of nuclear power plants and
earth-filled dams upwind or upstream from urban areas. A review of
a variety of U.S. warehousing and land-management practises indi-
cates that concern about nuclear war is not a practical problem. We
view nuclear war as a scientific curiosity, and most of the literature
on nuclear war effects focuses on esoteric phenomena such as ozone.
But, as Hal Hollister has aptly said, "when you've lost 80% of your
industry and half your population, then to be able to worry about an
increase in sunburn and skin cancer is- a real luxury. " [60]
Second, and following from this, is the dismissal of the So-
viet Union as a would-be aggressor in the nuclear realm. To be
sure, if no good at all can come from nuclear employment, aggres-
sion is tantamount to madness. Putting aside the excellent argu-
ments advanced by Ikle and ottiers that this is a contingency as
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worthy of our attention as others [10], the fact of the matter is that,
should the Soviets feel differently about the use of nuclear forces as
genuine goals of conflict, the consequences of a U.S. /Soviet confron-
tation could be disaster.
What adds special relevance to this question is the seeming
determination--the apparent existence of some prime mover--driving
Soviet strategic force developments. The basis for the expensive
and qualitatively dramatic Soviet initiatives naturally is a subject for
debate and discussion. Among the explanations favoring the view of
an essentially benign Soviet Union are (1) the build-up as a symptom
of traditional Soviet paranoia and overcompensation for perceived
external threats, (2) constant dynamic force innovations as a result
of internal Soviet bureaucratic politics (3) overdoing things to hedge
against chronic Soviet shortcomings in technical capabilities (espe-
cially missile reliability), and (4) the Soviets are just catching up
with what we did in the 1960s. Interestingly, none of these explana-
tions impute any specific operational objectives to the Soviet objec-
tives, that is, Soviet force developments are the result of factors
which have nothing to do with any goals which might be tarmed
"
tmilitary". In this respect, perceptions of the Soviet planning
world mirror-image our own situation.
Complementing these views are interpretations of the Soviet
occupation as being guided by some "rational" agency, in the sense
that Soviet planners decide on some course of action and then imple-
ment it straightaway in their fielded forces. Regrettably, most dis-
cussion of this possibility quickly descends to Clausewitz/Sokolovskii-
style sloganeering, and so debate is quickly enmired in the morass
of strategic "doctrine" and "mind sets. " Because proponents of the
rational view usually also prejudice their cases by proposing un'Oe-
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lievable levels of Soviet efficiency, sophistication, and cunning, the
rational view is equivalent to the "malignant" or "alarmist" view.
Still, out of the vast body of literature, some excellent analy-
sis persuasively argues that Soviet activities do reflect a genuine
linkage of force and employment planning. It is this possibility--
the existence of some set of objectives and, within realistic margins,
the translation of "strategy" into forces and plans--that is the source
of current American anxiety and consternation over Soviet activities.
In one view, we recall the image of "if the kids are quiet, they're up
to no good, " and in another view we will -YIodify the extent of the bad-
ness possible with care are sober assessment. But in either case,
most people would think that the U.S.S.R. has embraced far more
tightly the basic doctrine of U. S. strategic philosophy which is that
"you do not only need forces, but you need a plan. "
I will provide a single example o the issues at stake. Ac-
cording to one source [44:216],
"it seems highly likely (during the Cuban missile crisis)
that the Soviet leaders . . . did something that U.S.
leaders, as I know from my own experience, did only
in more general terms--that is, ask their military just
how a nuclear exchange would come out."
The civil defense debate is a most recent and excellent case-in-point.
Wild allegations and poor analyses have clouded debate. But the fact
remains, that even if Soviet C. D. is lousy, it does represent some of-
ficial recognition of Soviet value especially of (i) continuity of govern-
ment, and (ii) the value of population in recovery.
[61] is an informative review of tne more important trends in Soviet
strategy and some possible underlying motivations, and [90] provides
an interesting and credible explanation of Soviet planning with respect
to some defined military goals.
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And, another U. S. participant in the Cuban deliberations has recall-
ed that, when he proposed that the U. S. consider sone possible
"demonstrative" nuclear actions (should the Soviets not stand down),
the idea was rejected summarily by all the other participants present,
including some of the "coolest and most rationale" nuclear game
theorists of the day.
Now the U.S. is no more a rudderless ship than the Soviet
Union is a careening juggernaut, but in point of fact, tnere seems to
be highlighted a growing disparity in planning, to go with a growing
disparity in forces and capabilities. As a prerequisite for "recovery"
and for future proper strategic planning, the creation 01 an oojective
function for strategic planning is essential. Only in this way can the
U.S. deal with unforeseen contingencies, (if necessary, as Lambeth
has said, by making the least bad decision at a time when there are
no good ways out [6:23]. It seems to m that the core of any such ob-
jective function must be based on the sciution of the question: is
nuclear war war? Writing in 1962, the eminent British military his-
torian Michael Howard observed
"that the command of POLARIS or MINUTEMAN had
become a less-than-military affair" [102:151]
Nominated as representatives of the opposing "warfighting" school are
many analysts whose proposed employment repertoire (often) consists
of first, surgical, and selective strikes, tricky laydowns, kinky tim-
ing, and the like. But few of these proposals are even remotely con-
nected with strategic warfighting objectives as these pertain to central
or theater nuclear war. A consequence of the type of thinking spring-
ing from "drawdown curves, " and worse representations of reality is a
disconnect between national political purpose and the ability of nucle-
ar forces to do a limited number of things. I personally do not see
how the elimination of the Soviet capability for refining oil or im.-
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prisoning dissidents fits in with any such objectives.
(I should note that I have excluded a new force, with its own
methods and missions from this analysis. Arms control rapidly is
changing the DYAD into a TRIAD. Already it appears that arms
control will add new complexity to the problem.)
In this thesis I have discussed some of tne implications of
the force sizing/employment break. The glue to render fit the
pieces should be the selection of national aims and effective appli-
cation of nuclear capabilities to these aims, wherever desirable
and feasible.
115
NOTES FOR CHAPTER II
1. SAC has traditionally invested great effort in ensuring the penetra-
bility of strategic aircraft. Bomber operations might be called "mode-
linked," i.e. the failure of a single aircraft.on penetration can result
in many targets going uncovered; compensation for this involves inefficient
and redundant targeting. Accordingly, it is better to act to ensure
penetration survivability. See [33]. Among the specialized systems
that have been oriented towards defense suppression have been the B-58
bomber, the SNARK (and the cancelled NAVAJO), SKYBOLT, and, possibly
the first ICBMs. The technical prerequisites of a Defense Suppression
system are its ability to (i) arrive before the aircraft, (ii) destroy
a target which may be to some extent hard and spread out over a large
area, (iii) arrive reliably. Reliability for each bomber can be
enhanced by having the aircraft carry its own suppressive munitions:
RASCAL, HOUND DOG, SCAD, SRAM, and ALCM head up this list.
2. Originally, SAC was maintained at a low state of readiness, with
the potential to go to sustained alert conditions. Subsequently, bomber
alerts became more "intense" for lesser numbers of aircraft during
peacetime conditions, so that these planes could flyout under warning
of enemy missile attack. In an extreme crisis, it is possible to disperse
bombers to civil airfields (and even operate off the interstate, e.g.) to
avoid the destructive preemption a missile-armed enemy could inflict.
However, to maintain bombers at a high state of alert for a long time
is a difficult matter. Fresh crews must be provided as alert crews become
fatigued, the plane must be maintai ed, fueled and armed, the nuclear
weapons aboard the plane must be carefully guarded, communications must
be intact between dispersed and airborne aircraft and the NCA. It is
possible to maintain forces at very high alerts in this way for a short
time. The same goes for withholding aircraft during a graduated war,
except that there is an even greater requirement for planes to stay on
the move.
3. Equivalent Megatonnage is commonly defined as the yield of a weapon
in megatons raised to the 2/3 power. It is thus a better index of the
destructive blast effects produced by the weapon. Lately, though, there
has been a dispute over the exponent [105]. An I- or P-95 is a targeting
device namely a circle containing a certain amount of Industrial capability
or population; the center of an I/P-95 can be used as an aimpoint for
a weapon of a given size. Contrary to the numbers appearing in this
text citation, McNamara's original criteria were 1/4- 1/3 population
destroyed and 2/3 industry destroyed.
4. According to Halberstam [97:91], McNamara wanted only 450 MINUTEMEN
at first. (The third wing was to be in New Hampshire). When asked by
JFK why he did not ask Congress for 450 missiles, McNamara reported that
a force of at least 1000 MINUTEMAN was the least he could take to
the Hill without being "murdered." McNamara's intention to lower the
bomber force is described in Chapter II of the thesis.
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5. Ref [20] and interviews
6. Possibly the best reason for retaining the TITAN IIs is their de facto
"early warning" capability. Most TII silos are appreciably south of
MM farms, and Soviet warheads launched through normal threat trajectories
from the same latitude would (so long as they flew similar trajectories)
arrive on TII targets several tens of seconds before they arrived at
the most Southerly MM silos at Whiteman AFB. A phased attack on the
whole of U.S. ICBM forces -- starting with TITAN and walking south to
North with ground bursts to avoid fratricide effects would
ensure a material interval during which a LUA option could be implemented,
at least for the most Northern wings. If an attack avoided TTTANS in
favor of coordinated nearly simultaneous shots on MM wings, the TITANs
could be fired under attack as a made-to-order LNO for use against
any number of useful Soviet target arrays. A criticism of Soviet IC
farm locations is in order, mainly because of their latitudinal organ-
ization.
7. W. Mooz [ 103 ] has detailed the attrition rates for combat
aircraft including bombers.
8. The B-58 was a dog. It originally was designed as an ALBM carrier
[39], and the aircraft/missile combination was almost certainly configured
with the defense suppression mission in mind ([50] indicates that what became
AGENA upper stage was the ALBM designed with the B-58 in mind.
General LeMay represented SAC opinion when he said that even in the
unlikely case that the B-58 could be made to fulfill its operational
requirements, SAC still did not want it.
9. The HOUND DOG is a jet powered cyuise missile which carries a nuclear
warhead of yield .65 or 3.5 MT depending on source. The missile is
no longer operational, and it was phased out largely because it
added serious drag to the B-52 (mainly through its pylons -- even the
SRAM pylons add 10-12% drag at altitude). The HOUND DOG was at one
point to be equipped with Goodyear Aerospace ATRAN terrain matching
guidance but this was never implemented. Thus, the HOUND DOG was
relatively inaccurate.
10. As SecDef McNamara himself observed in one instance (concerning the
Walkure cancellation),
In fact, the whole debate on the B-70 tedned toward terms
which had very little to do with the facts of the situation.
There was a lot of talk about missiles versus bombers. I have
no feeling about missiles versus bombers as such. If bombers
serve our national interest, then we should be interested in
bombers; if missiles, then we should be interested in the mix..[95:92]
As some reports [4] & [5] indicate, McNamara saw a less than central
requirement for strategic aircraft.
11. The B-28 and B-43 were early nuclear bombs, probably with yields greater
than 5 Megatons. One of these was probably a weapon with about 24 MT yield.
[98]. The B-53 was a bomb for the B-52; since the W-53 was the TITAN IIs
warhead (with yield 9 MT) I assume that the B-53 has the same yield. Sub-
117
sequently, new bombs were developed. Lately nuclear warheads for
gravity bombs are said to have a set of low dialable yields ranging
from about 1.2 MT (maximum) to fairly low yields, possibly on the
order of 440 KT. [16] & [104]
12. Although ultimate force levels were set more-or-less firmly
by late-1961 [1:Chapter II], deliveries of some forces (especially SSBNs)
continued into CY67. (All long-lead funding for SSBNs had been included
in budgets through FY64). Submarine construction is relatively lengthy
and a boat is typically not deployed operationally for up to a year
after it is launched (for shake-down and sea trials). The THRESHER
accident was one factor which led to a delay in SSBN commissioning
because of tighter inspection criteria.
13. In addition to these strategic force levels (SNDVs and RVs), U.S.
and Soviet forces include a large number of theater nuclear warheads.
Although some U.S. TNFs have had an unambiguous ability to strike the
Soviet ZI -- including THOR, JUPITER, MACE (esp. the B mod), REGULUS,
and the like -- the only "theater forces" capable of reaching Soviet
targets on a two-way mission today are the F-llls (two wings of which
are based in the U.K.) (F-4s could do this mission, but would have
trouble recovering). TNFs are excluded from this analysis. The
reader is invited to inspect [ 15 1, [ 45 1 and [ 48 ].
14. See Foster [11]. This is because of a certain minimal "buy-in"
weight for any weapon, for reentry shielding, HE trigger, arming, fuzing,
safety, and other gadgetry. Because the yield of a weapon increases
faster than linearly with respect to the weight of an RV, the relationship
Weight raised to the 1.5 power is sometimes cited as a very rough rule
of thumb. If EMT is defined as yield to the 2/3 power, then net EMT
is roughly constant regardless of fractionation. However, Y also
depends on Y:W ratio, design, composition of the bomb, adjustments for
tailored nuclear weapons effects, and so on. Furhter, the EMT scaling
exponent of 2/3 is the subject of constant and hot debate. Downwards
revision of the exponent to a new value of as low as 0.3 have been
proposed [105], so this "rule" must be considered as a very crude heuristic.
I am indebted to Professors G. Rathjens, and J. Ruina, for their
views on this.
15. Peter Gold, of the Office of Senator Gary Hart (D-Colo) has expressed
the view widely held by many analysts (including nearly all Minimum
Deterrence theoreticians) in his observation that "a single POSEIDON
submarine could destroy 160 Soviet cities." However, there are a
several factors which render this comment inaccurate: they include
problems with missile reliability, range, warhead yield (and criteria
for target destruction), and MIRV "footprint" limitations. Thus, in the
OTA study on the Effects of Nuclear War 5061, the U.S. in its attack
on Soviet energy production and distribution targets is unable to cover
the entire target system with its allotted 10 SNDVs -- this is because
of MIRV footprint restriction (the footprint of an SLBM is, relatively
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speaking, much smaller than those of ICBMs, and the footprints of
ICBMs with small throwweights are smaller than those with larger
throwweights per RV). As General Russ Dougherty, former CinCSAC is
said to have put the footprint issue, "Show me a man who can kill
twenty ducks with one shotgun shell and I want him on JSTPS."
16. Nor should they. While specific force structure matters must play
a role in setting relative priorities for allocation, internal factors
as well as external considerations can be counted on (rightly) to dom-
inate strict analytical requirements as determinants of force sizing
decisions. Among the most potent internal factors are uncertainty of
the present and future (including capabilities, adversarial intentions
abilities, and technology), the sensitivity of decisions to the
dictates of marginal utility of expenditures directed towards the same
goal, and the possibilities for substitution of alternate forces and
concepts (including "denial", negotiated and non-military solutions as
options). An array of external factors -- which include institutional,
economic, management, and political issues -- may be stronger even than
all internal inputs. Thus, wer are constrained by an OMB "top line,"
and resources must be equitably shared between many enterprises. We
cannot ignore management issues -- we can't start up and shut down
programs as we please, etc. Most persuasive is the fact that"analytic
determinism" is in violation of the democratic process which Defense --
like any other public activity -- is constituted annually to serve.
17. Among the systems which McNamara phased out, cancelled, or procured
in less-than-originally programmed quantities were: (Strategic systems
along listed) ABM, advanced ICBM, AMSA, B/RS-70, B-58, DYNA-SOAR, MOL,
F-12, about 300 B-52s, many ADC/ANG squadrons, ARADCOM and ADC NIKE,
HAWK, and BOMARC batteries, SKYBOLT, most of SAGE/BUIC, ANP, SLAM,
TITAN I, ATLAS, the SR-71, JUPITER/THOR, MACE A/B, MATADOR, SNARK,
REGULUS, HOUND DOG, the 7th MINUTEMAN WING, and four extra POLARIS SSBNS.
18. Even so, alert rates have fallen with time, from 50% to 40% in the
late 1960s, to 30% in about 1974. Airborne alert was cancelled with
(i) the hardening of ICBMs, and (ii) the costs -- in terms of operations
and accidents -- of airborne alert. Closing strategic bases, it might
be observed, is as hard as closing any other base, and the resistance
encountered here is another deterrent to trimming forces at the edges.
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NOTES FOR CHAPTER III
1. An example of a "cute" LNO is an attack on the refining capability
of the USSR. I say "cute," because it is not immediately apparent
how such an attack would help U.S. interests in a larger military
contest. However, Schlesinger has spoken of such an attack as a
sample LNO [20:46], and the 0.T.A., in its recent study, the Effects
of Nuclear War includes a hypothetical exchange of 10 SNDVs aimed at
the--petroleum refineries of the other side.
2. See Collier's magazine, 27 October 1951, for a fictional "I was
there," news account of a nuclear war bearing a strong resemblance
to HALFMOON. The highlight of World War III there is an airborne
suicide assault on a Soviet nuclear weapons plant in the Urals.
3. Apparently, in the late 1940's and early 1950's, U.S. planners
felt that the largest bomb which might someday be in the U.S. arsenal
would have a yield of something like 100 Kilotons. This sentiment
was prevalent at a time when the successful manufacture of an H-bomb
was not certain. It was thought that preinitiation of fission would
prevent the fabrication of larger weapons than 100.KT. However, the
expert weapons designer, Ted Taylor, built a special Uranium bomb,
(The "S.O.B.," for Super Oralloy Bomb), which had a yield in the "megaton
range." [24:140ff].
4. Through the early 1950s there were no such things as hard or point
targets in the Soviet Union. To maximize the area covered by a modest
amount of blast (as was done at Hiroshima, e.g.), the Air Force con-
sidered only relatively high altitude airbursted weapons. The USAF
had not considered the notion of surface bursts, and, to study the
fallout activity of an airburst bomb which accidentally fell to
the ground before detonating (as well as analyzing some ground burst
applications,) the JANGLE series of surface and subsurface
tests was organizaed. [27:40-41].
5. The issues at stake are highlighted in the B-36 dispute. [10:32].
The original USAF orientation towards countervalue (in the Douhetian
style), and U.S.N.'s interest in Mahanian-type counterforce attacks
have slowly reversed over time. I am indebted to Jack Nunn and
LTC Bob Clewell, USA, for some interesting pointers on the subject
of the U.S.'s offensive tradition. The interested reader is encour-
aged to see [93].
6. As carrier and TAC pilots assigned to nuclear delivery missions against
peripheral targets in the 1940s/1950s will tell you, there was no
coordination between SAC and the other concerned services in the areas
of mission and sortie coordination. All of the pilots who I have
spoken with have outlined the key issue (in their eyes) having to
do with coordination, namely the fear that tactical aircraft would
be threatened by the larger yield nuclear weapons dropped by SAC
aircraft operating at much higher altitudes. [5] also notes that




8. See page 103 of this paper.
9. Reference to "lay down" options and problems in some respects
seems to be a giveaway of.planning interest in the problems
associated(usually with avoiding) collateral damage from nuclear
bursts.
10. A priori estimates of military capabilities, especially those
hinging on technical factors have been terrible throughout history.
Most notably there is the matter of the estimated casualties caused
by the delivery of bombs prior to World War II. Because of some
isolated incidents of World War I "strategic bombing," -- e.g. a
Gotha raid scored an accidental direct hit on a school in Poplar,
London, causing many casualties and precipitating a local riot --
it was felt that (by analogue) the delivery of 1 ton of bombs in
World War II would cause 50 casualties. Of course the figure over-
estimated the actual damage done by a very large margin. [107]. Another
example of technical assessment is found in R.. Wohlstetter's Pearl
Harbor.[109]. Prior to 7 December, U.S. intelligence officials did
not think that the Japanese had solved the technical problems associated
with launching torpedoes from aircraft into shallow water. Of course,
the Japanese had indeed solved this problem. This machine gun is
another case in point.
11. The "cookie cutter" describes a circle around the ground zero
[GZ] of a weapon within which every type of a given target of
interest is considered destroyed with no damage occurring outside
the perimeter of the cookie cutter. [See 100]. Based on AEC theoret-
ical and empirical data, a cookie cutter for fatalaties and U/I
damage corresponds to about the 5 psi overpressure contour for weapons
of relatively low yield. More recently, a more sophisticated log-
normal index has been devised which has a non "abrupt" cut-off for the
edge of the cutter, to take into account the gradual (not quantum)
fall off in lethality with increasing distance from GZ. The new non-
zero-sigma rules lower Pk values slightly within a certain distance
of GZ.
12. The SIOP is accordingly a very complex document which is continually
updated as new targets appear and as prioritization decisions are
changed; in short the SIOP is very easily perturbed by any number of
phenomena. Imagine a package of weapons for an assured destruction
attack on a certain city. Suppose a new target is found which is not
covered by adequate blast from previously programmed weapons. The
entire package must be reworked, since all weapons are linked in the
laydown and the movement of one weapon can only be done by rewriting
the:-entire package.
13. In the early 1970s, the Soviets apparently decided to superharden
their silos. Beginning with their most modern launchers, it is reported
that all silos will be hardened to 3000 psi. [Air Force magazine,
March 1977 page 37. The net program cost is said to be $20Billion;
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at U.S. prices, this describes a hardening program for all Soviet
launchers. 3000 psi may be a trifle high, since this is the ultimate
compressive strength of cement. See AW&ST, 18 April 1977 p 18. The
U.S. is said to have spent about $10Million per silo in its upgrade
program. [108].
Silo response to translational accelerations and to dynamic (Q) drag
on headworks is not well understood, and is subject to sufficiently
many externalities and influences that the simple popular rules of
Pk based on such-and-such a psi may be wildly inaccurate under some
circumstances. Moreover, interactive phenomena, such as reflected over-
pressure and unreliability in fuzing (as well as the well-known CEP
variable) further compound difficulties. Data on the individual vuln-
erability of U.S. silos is available in classifed sources, but even so,
unpredictable factors, such as the height of the water table, will figure
prominently in actual circumstances. Consequently I do not vouch for the
accuracy of these silo hardness numbers; they are used only to illustrate
a trend:
YEAR AVERAGE SILO HARDNESS NUMBER OF TARGETS
1967 200 psi 570
1971 325 psi 1513
1975 490 psi 1603
1979 1350 psi 1508
1983 1650 psi (1550)
Note on Fratricide: To be sure, the fratricide constraint is a salient
matter, but the experience of 35 years suggests that few engineering problems
defy solution for long. If there is even a small probability that fratricide
will not destroy incoming shots (say, if a second airburst disperses
the debris in the stem of a first ground burst shot), then the subsequent
shots can improved materially OPK versus silos -- if warheads are available.
Also if RVs do not fuze or explode to South of silos, nth shots can arrive with
impunity. Fratricide, first widely reported in "Why ICBMs can survive a
nuclear war," [Air Force magazine, 1975], has all the beauty of a McNamara
force structure limiter.
Given historical U.S. interest in Counterforce attacks, I assume that something
like 0.9 is used as a DE for RVSN targets. [AWST reports 0.87 as a HTK DE,
11 July 1970, p 15].
14. "CMP" -- CounterMilitary Potential -- is an index of HTK capability also
known as "K". However CMP is an inaccurate index at low CEPs, since CMP
increases even after the target comes within the cookie cutter of the weapon.
Tom Brown has observed that a single weapon with nearly perfect accuracy would
have a CMP sufficient to destroy many targets (when divided between them).
This is of course impossible. J. Foster [11 ],and Foster and Bruce Bennett
(in an unpublished Rand Working Note) have advanced the ECMP formulation
which includes this fact and also takes into account the properties of
individual targets.
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15. This is especially the case for iron-wheel (gimballed) gyros.
Strapdown and similar INS technologies might render ICBM guidance
packages less vulnerable to ground shock.
16. Weapons that are cold-launched -- i.e. thrown clear from a silo
or launch tube before the missile's engine is ignited -- can be reloaded,
since such weapons do not destroy a silo as utterly as do missiles
which are "hot launched", i.e. ignited in the silo. Two of the Soviet
fourth generation ICBMs -- the SS-17 and SS-18 -- are cold-launched
and can be refired (by loading an extra missile into a launcher). Because
the Soviet Union is building many more such missiles than are required to
fill holes and to conduct a test program, and because there is evidence
that the Soviets are (i) storing reloads in bunkers near silos and (ii)
practising reloading, the reload problem might be a justification for
hitting "empty holes." Cold launching has other advantages: the volume
of a silo or other launcher can be more completely filled with ICBM, since
the silo need not contain channels for venting the hot exhaust gases of
hot launched missiles. Also, if the missile is a dud -- and 90% of missile
failures occur during primary engine ignition--- the dud round is thrown
clear of the silo or launch tube, permitting a reload and also minimizing
the risk of the defective missile to the launcher (especially valuable in
the case of SLBMs).
17. Command Data Buffer simulates ICBM trajectories using local gravitational
gradiometric data when the targets for missiles are changed. Thus, when
a MINUTEMAN III is in the process of being retargeted it may be down during
trajectory recomputation and unavaillable for prompt launching.
18. At the highest state of alert, up to 25% of NATOs nuclear capable aircraft
may be standing QRA. Needless to say, this puts a bite in NATO's air-to-ground
conventional capabilities at the time they are most needed [esp. all-WX
capability, i.e. the F-lll]. USAFE has therefore opposed the continuation
of this practise and has sought to prevent the nuclear-hardwiring of
the F-15 and F-16 (they lost on the latter).
19. Metzger and Doty [56] indicate the equivalent of 3 SSBNs assigned to NATO,
but it is unclear in this account whether this number refers to on-station
forces or total NATO-committed forces. From many indications -- especially
the fact that the U.S. original SSBN "donation" to NATO (at the 1962 Athens
summit) was five boats, I reckon that their "480" RV figure is on-station
force. At a generated DEFCON, and given SSBN availability, a fourth boat
could probably be turned around or sped to patrol areas which, incidently,
need not be very far from CONUS. Using the U.S.'s perenniel 2-CV commitment
as a model, it is doubtful that the number of U.S. SSBNs could decrease without
a NATO ministerial "firestorm."
20. [Deleted]
21. Anotier factor contributing to the rigidity of bomber operations is
the need for working around training and practise doctrine for nuclear
delivery.
22. Wm. Perry has used the metaphor of "pellets from a shotgun" in describing
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the U.S.'s cruise missile penetration concept.
23. A preferential offense is based on the following concept: a defender
is obliged to defend all targets from all sorts of threats, while an
attacker can select a single attack tactic and time and coordinate his
attacks to friendly advantage. Thus, Soviet air defenses must anticipate
an all-azimuth U.S. bomber or cruise missile attack, while SAC can pick
small corridors through which all forces will travel, overwhelming local
defenses. The relative cost to the U.S. of maintaining a threat which
requires a given level of Soviet defensive outlays is spoken of under the
rubric of "cost exchange ratios."
24. See K. Lewis, "Hanging in there: Why and How; a Review of R. Berman's
Soviet Air Power in Transition," an unpublished paper, Rand Corporation,
July 1978.
25. Although they are used frequently as vernacular expressions, both
"recovery" and "viability" are technically defined for the purposes of
target planners. Viability, first discussed in detail in S. G. Winter,
Jr.'s seminal work (110] is the prerequisite for recovery after U/I
warfare. An economy is said to be viable iff
(i) its output is sufficient to provide workers and their families
with a level of consumption high enough to encourage general
contribution to productive recovery activities and socially
acceptable behavior
(ii) output is adequate to meet fixed claims on the economy (such
as a requirement to care for nonproductive citizens, to meet
further military and internal security demands, to dispose of
corpses and conduct the necessary demolition and public health
functions, etc.)
(iii) it is possible to maintain the stock of real capital (including
inventories) required to accomplish (i) and (ii) supra.
If an economy is not viable, then there will be tremendous pressures on
the productive citizenry to avoid recovery work in favor of individual
incentives, such as feeding their families. Workers will leave recovery
activities to "trek" and forage for supplies, and, as shortages take their
tolls, remaining workers will be even less productive, etc. A vicious
downward spiral ensues. Accordingly, it is thought to be necessary to
maintain viability (or restore it immediately), and targeteers might put
the destruction of viability as their primary goal. In this paradigm,
recovery is a classic race the survivors must run to ensure viability of
the U.S. economy prior to the exhaustion of inventories. However, as
Sobin and Bull ["Measurment of critical production capacities for models
of post-attack recovery," RAC-TP-387, February 1970] conclude:"it is
not easy to conclude (from a survey of literature) that any particular
kinds of capacities are the critical ones in the sense of providing absolute
limits (to recovering viability)." The answer to this dilemma is undoubtedly
expressed officially in most excessive statements of objective targeting
requi rements.
26. McNamara's original index for U/I damage -- IFS, or "Industrial Floor
Space," -- was chosen because it is very easy to compute. IFS is simply
the area occupied by plants involved in different (or nondifferentiated)
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economic activities. However, IFS is not a clear and very useful index
of U/I damage because it does not give any measure of losses in such
areas as services and agriculture. MVA (Manufacturing Value Added),
describes the amount of value added to raw materials in manufacturing
processes. It is a more refined index of industrial production, but it
too does not include Services. Other indices of economic damage are
GNP (Gross National Product), GVO (Gross Value of Output), and K (for
Capital). With GNP it is theoretically possible to compute the loss to
an economy in terms of "services destroyed" -- but because an exact deter-
mination depends on knowing who was killed and who was not, GNP calculations
are not very useful from an analytic point-of-view. GVO double counts
the value of inputs, and K does not include services.
27. A useful expression of population colocation with industrial activities
is as follows:
Population within US USSR
1.0 nmi of industry 9 16
1.5 nmi " 22 31
2.5 nmi " 45 44
5.0 nmi " 65 62
Source: Armed Forces J. International, May 1979, p 26
28. By other indices (floor space, including floor space calculations
normalized for multi-story dwellings), the USSR is far more concentrated
than is the United States. See DCPA Attack Environment Manual.
29. Soviet planning indeed tends towards "gigantism" in plant sizing.
The immense Kama River, Atommash, and Pavladar plants each account for
a substantial fraction of Soviet output in motor vehicle, atomic reactor,
and Aluminum production. For sample industries, the Soviets are 50-100%
more concentrated than the U.S. [100]. Such large installations are
examples of a truly pervasive eggs-in-one-basket philosophy which has few
parallels in the U.S. civilian sector.
30. Individual target blast vulnerabilities may greatly exceed over-
pressures dictated by general area coverage rules. Industrial and residential
structures may collapse at 5 psi,but thorough destruction of dies, presses,
tooling, etc. may require 20-50 or more psi. Lightweight industrial
structures may even add to the survival prospects of fixtures by acting as
"spaced armor" (absorbing energy of the shock front and carrying it away
from targets below as the roof of the structure decomposes.) The Boeing
company, in conjunction with DNA, has shown that the resistance of indiv-
idual industrial equipments to blast effects can be enhanced greatly by
hasty measures [ Boeing Aerospace Company, "Industrial Survival and
Recovery after Nuclear Attack," Seattle, 1976 ]. In some experiments,
calculators and motorcycles were packed in woodchips or sandbags and
were able to survive overpressures exceeding 100 psi. As analyses of
recovery of individual industrial processes after World War II indicate,
survival of tools and equipment was much more important than the survival
of buildings per se as a determinant of recovery.
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31. In an authoritative report, R. U. Ayers has pointed out the following
faults of I/0 modelling [111]
o I/0 models are 'snapshots' of the economy and do not reveal
evolutionary trends and effects of trends
o dynamic features of production,esp. lead times are ignored
o allowance for substitution is a function of the number of sectors
in the model
o inter-industry coefficients are-fixed and therefore unrealistic
o lack of geographic specificity does not provide for the adverse
consequences of transpo disruption
o demand is typically a function only of supply and does not relate
to policy decisions
Among these, the key problems concern substitution and the detail
of available data. For example, within a given sector, there is the
provision for infinite substitutibility ... in sector "Tools", hammers are
as good as saws for every activity requiring tools. But there is no chance
for substituting between sectors, although the ingenuity of production
controllers has been demonstrated repeatedly; (this is especially the case
when labor can be substituted for a lost input of another type). "Imbalancing"
(i.e. bottlenecking) attacks are an intuitive consequence of I/0 economic
modelling, because the erasure of an industrial sector leads to general
economic collapse (since all sectors relying on the input of another activity
neutralized by the imbalancing attack collapse, etc.). But the fallacy of
this type of analysis is evident in the case of the imbalancing attack on
the Soviet paint industry proposed a few years back. Because (i) virtually
every economic activity in the USSR requires paint as an input, (ii) there
are very few paint plants in the USSR and little inventory, (iii) it takes
years to rebuild a paint plant, it "follows" that the Soviet economy should
grind to a halt after a counter-paint LNO
32. Some hard-core target planners with whom I spoke claim that the issuance
of NSDM 242 (anti-recovery guidance) to supercede previous viability-killing
was mainly based on the acknolegement by Defense Planners that it was
impossible, within the constraint on the number of warheads allowed
for U/I attacks,to destroy the viability of the USSR. Counter-recovery
targeting is said to be a "step down" from anti-viability targeting.
From an unclassified vantage point, there is little that can be said
about the ramifications of the changed guidance. It might be noted,
from an intuitive perspective, however, that nuclear weapons of any yield
do damage so efficiently (and the damage tends to be interactive), that
it is hard to imagine how a small change in targeting protocol would
produce radically different results of a full-SIOP attack. I would bet
that the results of various targeting philosophies in force over the
years have not changed much over time (at most by only a couple of
percent) in terms of numbers of key targets destroyed.
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NOTES FOR CHAPTER IV
1. According to Greenwood [8], and other sources, the original design
specified yield of the weapons inside of the Mk-3 (POSEIDON) RV was as high
as 70 kilotons. So far as I am aware, the nuclear weapon was not redesigned
after this performance requirement had been issued. As there were no impediments
to the test program (unlimited 70 KT testing is permitted under the tighter
150 KT test-ban threshhold set after the relevent period), I cannot think of
any reason that it would be impossible to reach the specified yield of 70 KT.
Of course, the Mk-3 yield is now reputed to be 40 KT. Thus, unless the warhead
configuration was changed in design stage, it is possible that some change
in the weapon "at the margin" was made to reduce yield by nearly 50%. The
most obvious (but not the only) candidate for suspicion would be the removal
of a warhead "booster," a vial of light isotopic fuels (which has come into
notoriety in connection with W. Pincus' reporting of the "ERW" or "neutron
bomb" controversy.) (A liability of a.) Tritium booster is the fact that
the SSBN must take off time to have the warheads "recycled," insofar as
the half-life of Tritium is something like 12 years). Unless the warhead
design was changed, then, or unless the engineers charged with developing the
system failed to satisfy the 70 KT requirement, then it is possible that some
intentional steps were taken to downgrade the yield of the POSEIDON weapons.
2. According to some articles in Aviation Week, the Command Data Buffer
[CDB) permits an improvement in ICBM accuracy independent of other improvements
in RV performance. [Interview, Mike Callaham, MIT Program for Science and
Technology in International Security]. What the CDB does is simulate ICBM
trajectories against new targets, taking into account anomalous gravitational
forces in the North American continent over which the ICBMs will be flying.
An improved gradiometric system will use the floated, neutral buoyancy AIRS
sphere to accomplish on-board gravitational gradiometry (to improve geoid
models which do not incorporate mapped anomalies due to iron deposits, mountain
ranges, etc.). See the March 1977 Astronautics and Aeronautics, article
entitled "Gravity Gradiometry."
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GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS USED
A.D. Assured Destruction
ABRES Advanced Ballistic Reentry Systems
ADC Air Defense Command
ANG Air National Guard
ARADCOM Army Air Defense Command
ASM Air-to-Surface Missile
C3 ("C-cubed") Command, Control, Communications
CEP Circular Error Probable
CF Counterforce
CONUS Continental United States
CPI Consumer Price Index.
DDRE Department (or Director) of Defense Research & Engineering
DE Damage Expectency
DGZ Designated Ground Zero
EMT Equivalent Megaton
FYDP Five Year Defense Plan
GSP General Strike Program
HCL H-hour Line of Control
HTK Hard Target Kill
IFS Industrial Floor Space
JSCP Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
JSOP Joint Strategic Operations Plan
JSTPS Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff
"K" (a.k.a. CMP, for Counter Military Potential), Lethality Index
LCF Launch Control Facility
LNO Limited Nuclear Option (sometimes SNO)
LOW Launch-on-Warning
MVA Manufacturing Value Added
NCA National Command Authority
NESC Net Evaluation SubCommittee
NOP Nuclear Operational Plan
NSTAP National Strategic Target and Planning Guidance
OPK Overall Probability of Kill
OSD Office of the Secretary of Dpfcnse
PAL Permissive Action link
PLS Prelaunch Survivability
PSP Priority Strike Plan
QRA Quick Reaction Alert
RV Reentry Vehicle
RVSN Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces
SDF Strategic Defense Forces
SEP Selective Employment Plan
SIOP Single Integrated Operational Plan
SNDV Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicle
SNF Strategic Nuclear Forces
SOF Strategic Offensive Forces
TAI Total Authorized Inventory
TDI Target Data Inventory
TN Tactical Nuclear (or theater nuclear)
TOA Total Obligational Authority
U/I Urban/Industri al
ZI Zone of the Interior
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